Why Shifting Focus from Europe to China Could Backfire on the U.S. | Summit Roundtable

Can the U.S. afford to shift its focus to China while Russia remains a threat?

Following the GNSI Summit on the Russian-Ukraine War, experts break down why abandoning Europe could be a serious mistake—and how Russian and Chinese aggression are more connected than you think. Maintaining a strong military presence in Europe isn’t just about defending allies—it’s about global stability.

The conversation explores why the U.S. must strike a balance between investing in legacy military systems and rapidly adopting new technologies like drones to stay ahead of emerging threats. The key to success? Proactive deterrence. Preventing conflicts before they start is more effective—and less costly—than responding after the damage is done.

Don’t miss this insightful deep dive into the future of U.S. defense strategy and why global power dynamics are more intertwined than ever. Subscribe to the “At the Boundary” Podcast to stay up to date on global policy!

Links From the Episode:

• FSP Cyber Frontier Summit on April 15th

• Critical Resources for National Security Decision Brief

At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

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The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.

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Transcript

Glenn Beckmann: 0:12

Hi everybody. Welcome to another episode of at the boundary, the podcast from the global and national security Institute at the University of South Florida. I'm Glenn Beckman, communications manager at GNSI with you today. Four at the boundary on the pod. We're going to talk a little bit about GNSI Tampa Summit. Five, now that we've had a chance to catch our collective breath and absorb everything that was presented at the conference two weeks ago. We want to gather some folks together and talk about what we all learned before we do that. However, a couple of headlines to pass along. If you remember, last week, we made the big announcement of the first ever conference produced and hosted by the GNSI future strategist program, the student organization at USF dedicated to students interested in a career in national security. It's going to be a great event focused on cyber security. Each of the five sessions will have FSP students serving as moderators and facilitators for guest speakers from the industry and from academia, and they'll be diving into pivotal cyber topics like enhancing defense and navigating emerging threats zero trust architecture, protecting data in a post quantum world and securing the digital economy. We can't wait to see what these fantastic students have put together, and we urge you to support them by attending the conference, which is scheduled for April 15 in the Oval theater at the Marshall Student Center on the Tampa campus of USF, registration is now open. It's an in person event. There's no cost to attend, but registration is required. We'll drop a link to register in the show notes. And hey, we want to send out big congratulations this week to the team at the College of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and computing here at USF, or should we more accurately say the Bellini College of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and computing, making it the first named college in the United States dedicated exclusively to the convergence of cybersecurity and AI. USF announced last week that Arnie and Lauren Bellini have made a record setting, $40 million gift to the University establishing the college, and the Bellini support will go even further. They've pledged $1 for dollar matching program for additional money raised for the college. Now, if you remember, in last week's at the boundary, we talked with Professor John licatto of cake, and honestly, we need to start calling it Bellini cake, right? Anyway, John hinted that something big was coming, and boy was he right. Congratulations to everyone involved. What a huge announcement for USF and for cake. We also want to remind you of the upcoming rethinking Afghanistan part two conference coming up on May 20. The conference will be held in Washington, DC. That's our first out of town conference for our team here at GNSI. Details are still being worked out, so keep an eye out on our website and to your inboxes for more information. All right, it's time now for the most important segment of the podcast. Today, we're gathering a few people to talk about our recently completed Tampa summit five, the Russia, Ukraine war lessons for future conflicts. We started this round table discussion idea a post mortem, if you will, following our last conference, and it was so well received, we're going to do it again. So we're bringing into the studio Dr Tad schnaufer, strategy and research manager at GNSI, Dr golf Alex the director of the USF Institute for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, Sarah Brown, Research Coordinator at GNSI, and the planner for TS five, along with Johan hermita, a USF student who's a member of FSP, and he also got up on stage at the conference to present his research to the entire audience. Tad, take it away. Well,

Tad Schnaufer: 4:21

thank you, Glenn, for that wonderful introduction. So why don't we go ahead and get started with our elite group of now podcasters here discussing the recent global national security Institute's Tampa summit number five, focused on the Russian war in Ukraine. So why don't we kick it over to Sarah first. And overall, what was one of the most interesting things, or the most interesting thing you took away from the conference? Well, for me, one of the most interesting things from the conference is, besides the phenomenal discussions that were had by a variety of folks, is that there really seemed to be a sense that the United States is no longer going to be a security guarantor for.

Sarah Brown: 5:00

Are at the global stage, and what that role is, I think a lot of people are the unknown is scary, and how that role become, transitioning away from a security guarantor to something else, whatever it may be, is still undetermined, but it's it's a little fearful for folks right now, because it's not what's been happening for the past 70 years with the NATO alliance, and there's just so much uncertainty right now. So that was one of the bigger key takeaways that I took away from the conference. Really a major theme. Yeah, it's gonna be playing. Yeah. It was especially interesting the way the guests from Europe, Mr. Norberg and general rupees, what they said about how Europeans are feeling in the wake of this new policy, and it's not so new, actually, because a lot of people were saying, Well, why? Why wasn't Europe more prepared for the second Trump administration? Because, you know, we they, they should have anticipated this move away from from global engagement, but nonetheless, I think it was very striking, and I received a lot of really positive feedback from that panel. In particular, I think Americans were really happy to hear a European perspective, and also to hear their sense of vulnerability and concern. You know, what are the next steps going to look

Yoan G. Hermida: 6:26

like? Yeah, I completely agree with the previous two comments. My biggest takeaway was from Dr Johan Norberg letter to Putin and the despair that I noticed in his argument and absolutely, very striking the Europeans even, even though they should have been prepared for what may have been coming with the Trump administration, I think it completely caught them by surprise. And you do detect that level of high level of uncertainty as to what the next steps may be in their in their actions, whether they'll be able to regroup and, you know, get a cohesive, coherent defense policy together in the face of what seems to be increasing levels of doubt about the Transatlantic Alliance. I thought it was very interesting to note with the Europeans that their reaction has been, in a sense, stronger to the Trump administration, second Trump administration, than to the actual invasion itself. So if you look at the $800 billion the Europeans are looking to pull together for defense spending that came not because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It came from the possibility, this idea that the US could withdraw security guarantees, or at least not be as 100% guarantee of a protector of Europe. So that's what's actually driving them, even as the threat of Russia as a conventional, large scale military operations underway, that still was not enough, right? I think that the Biden administration's commitment to engagement and to our allies was so unequivocal that they just took it for granted. But I also think that they should have been prepared, you know, because the first Trump administration demonstrated these, this tendency to pull away from from our role in the world, questioning NATO and so on. So, yeah, absolutely. I think they they were a little spoiled, because Biden was so committed to the war and to our alliances and to NATO but that. But they should have understood that in American politics, you know, the pendulum swings, and different administrations come and go, and it's not anything for presidential administrations to call out allies for not spending enough, and certainly from the first Trump administration and from the invasion the a lot of the eastern flank, NATO Allies particularly, have increased their defense spending. I'm noting Lithuania and Poland, for example, which are spending a lot, but the other allies certainly are looking to pick up more of the slack now that there's a possibility the US starts withdrawing troops from Europe and these other possibilities, even as the war continues, I think one of the speakers, I think it was one of the European speakers, mentioned that

Sarah Brown: 9:12

the head of NATO is now saying that they have all this money but no time to build up the defense forces, whereas before they had all the time to train and prepare, but no money. So it's interesting to see the interplay of the EU and NATO trying to step in that vacuum that the US is leaving. Yeah.

Yoan G. Hermida: 9:33

And another thing that I would add about Dr Norberg intervention is, as someone who was born in an authoritarian state, there was a point in his intervention that he said that he's lived 50 years without having to fear for his freedom. So, you know, the implication is that now he does, and the the existential threat for the Scandinavian countries and those on the the Europeans on the eastern flank that they feel. From Russia, compounded with what seems to be a certain level of abandonment by the US is palpable beyond the power dynamics beyond, you know, the percentage of GDP, it's it's a real it's something that strikes to the core of your being and your freedom,

Golfo Alexopoulos: 10:21

all right, and I think it made a big impression on the audience. If I can shift to another takeaway, one of the most striking conversations, I thought, first of all, there were so many moments in the conference that were really striking to me, but the the opening panel on the second day, which was with Maria snegovaya and Chris Marsh. Christopher Marsh, so what was interesting about their discussion, which you so so effectively moderated had was that they expressed a a difference of opinion that is just central in the field, and that is, did the what did the West have a major role to play in Putin's decision to invade Ukraine? And Maria made a strong argument that the West tends to exaggerate its influence on Russian politics, and that really Putin sensed he was always going to move on Ukraine, because he considers Ukraine within his sphere of influence. He just waited for a time when he perceived the West to be at its weakest, you know, after the failed withdrawal from Afghanistan and and the signs that he was getting from two American administrations about about not engaging in foreign conflicts. So I think that Maria was making that argument about continuity and about Putin really being driven by his own domestic concerns and his own view of Russian sphere of influence and its role in the world. And then Chris was making the argument that that the West lost Russia, and that we in our in not respecting Russia's as a great power after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in our expansion of NATO, we didn't pay enough attention to Russia's security concerns and Russia's Russia's desire to remain relevant and remain and to be seen as a great power. So I thought that was really interesting, because this debate rages in the field. You know, there are those who think that the West is responsible. There are those who believe that Putin would have behaved regardless of Western actions, and I thought that was so nicely illustrated in the conversation between Chris and Maria

Yoan G. Hermida: 13:12

completely agree on that. Dr alexapolis, Dr snegovaya, she mentioned how Putin's worldview was really conditioned by growing up in the Soviet Union being, you know, part of the KGB, as we all know. And I think there's, there's a lot to that, I think, in my, my opinion, and I guess, what I might take away from what Dr snickel was saying was that Putin knows very well that no matter how far east NATO expanded, it was never going to invade Russia proper, right? He knew that very well. So I think those who are like you said, those are who are in the camp of NATO expansion was what caused Russia to lash out fundamentally misunderstand, or don't give a lot of credence to sort of the constructivist argument of Putin's worldview and how he grew up and his ideology, right? It's also, I was also struck by what you mentioned about the 90s as a pause in the Cold War. So we often think of the Cold War as having ended in 91 collapse of Soviet Union, and then you had the Unipolar Moment. Which of the US was the primacy the hegemon. But in reality, the argument that it was simply a pause as Russia revamped its economic and military capabilities to continue its actions during the during the Cold War, or similar to the Cold War, really resonated with me as well. Yeah, and Maria has actually written a lot about this, about how the elites in Soviet society, the nomenclatura under the Soviet regime, have basically continued. You know, it's not like we've had this incredible change in personnel and world views. You know, there's been this striking continuity. And she's demonstrated it in her research.

Golfo Alexopoulos: 15:00

Surge. And for that reason, I actually am more convinced by her argument too.

Sarah Brown: 15:06

I think folks tend to forget that the Cold War and the ending of the Cold War and the elites that was only 3040, years ago, those people are still in power. They were able to seamlessly transition from the old government to the new government in each of its iterations. So we tend to think, oh, the Cold War was in the past. It was, you know, close to 70 years ago when, really it ended in 1989 that's very recent. And I don't think we should be surprised that there is still an Imperial Russian dream being conducted by or Carrie out by Putin. Well, what

Tad Schnaufer: 15:46

we can say is, if it is a continuation of the same Cold War, then we won the first half, and we're losing the second half, because the first half there was no major conventional conflicts in Europe. Now again, you obviously have Russian intervention in Hungary in 56 in the Prague Spring in 68 but no large scale invasions. So the second half, something has changed. Even though Russia is, in a sense, weaker, it's much smaller than the Soviet Union. 15 independent republics or countries came out of the Soviet Union. It lost a lot of population, territory, minerals, resources, yet a smaller Russia, the inherent state of the Soviet Union is more aggressive. And I think what you can take away from our panel, the number of other panels and discussions throughout the entire conference, is that in the end, Putin, as with most authoritarian leaders, respects power, and that Putin acted not because, not necessarily because of NATO expansion or not, not because Ukraine is part of Russia, or not because The opportunity was there, and there was no set deterrence to actually deter him. We looking through history, when authoritarian leaders want something, they're going to take it if they're not effectively deterred through the fundamental currency of international relations, which is power. And if I can pick up on this point too Tad, because it's you're absolutely right, and it's something that general McKinsey mentioned in his remarks too, when he said that the Biden administration was fighting this war to withdraw, you know, not not fighting to win, not fighting to demonstrate overwhelming force and power and to really deter Russia, but just not to escalate. You know, to give just enough so that Ukraine can kind of defend itself, but not not lose, so that you so that Ukraine couldn't lose. But there wasn't really a strategy to ensure that Ukraine can win. And I think that was a big mistake, and it was something that general McKenzie really underscored in his remarks. I think some someone mentioned that the Biden administration wanted to manage this conflict as if it was a business case to keep it from escalating, like you mentioned, or from they didn't really have what a victory meant. There was no clear definition, at least from the US side, what a victory for the US would be in the Russian Ukraine conflict. And I think it's interesting that you know, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 if I'm remembering correctly, they did incursions in 2014

Sarah Brown: 18:15

there wasn't really an appetite then to interfere. Yet, something was different in 2022 when Russia did a full scale invasion.

Yoan G. Hermida: 18:26

Yeah, also, there are those who argue, and I think it sort of came out in the panel, that what better way to weaken Russia than to fight them by proxy, using the Ukrainians number one and number two, to not have a quick victory, so that the Russians lose personnel, they lose equipment. So that's the more sort of negative interpretation of the whole thing, right? Where it's the US was trying to weaken Russia by not supplying Ukraine the amount of military equipment that it needed to fully defeat them. So that, you know, the conflict continued, and Russia was weakened for years. Years. The problem with that concept is it's it's a you're trying to fight a war of attrition, but it's not a total war, neither. Russia is not completely mobilized. And what it in many ways, might have actually strengthened the Russians now, not obviously the outcome that the US or its allies would want, but a lot of people who left Russia in the initial mobilization were people who might have actually resisted the regime or voted differently, or actually might have supported democracy, right? So this a couple, you know, roughly a million Russians left in the beginning of the war. Obviously, they wanted to avoid a draft, those type of things, but those people might have been the ones that could have stood up to a Putin regime. Perhaps, in addition, Russia's economy just simply worked around the sanctions. It was now closer to China, and it might be a junior partner with China, but nonetheless, now you have two major powers that are working together because of like interests, and then really.

Tad Schnaufer: 20:00

Put the Russian economy on a war economy. So although in the short term, the Ukrainians are bleeding the Russians, the Russians are bleeding the Ukrainians, but their economy is going to be more oriented to production of drones, tanks, military equipment in the long term. So the Russia's ability to reconstitute its military will actually be better now, because they've been forced to reorient their overall industry towards the military outcome. So if you're looking to diminish the Russian military having a small, relatively small operation, this is not World War Two style operation, they can actually reorient their economy, actually be stronger in a few years than weaker. The states can be more consolidated that Putin did a lot of work to consolidate his power leading up to this war in the 2024 elections. Later on. So Putin, in many ways, might be in a more secure position. Yeah, and I think that that is one of the reasons why he's not likely to accept a negotiated settlement, because he has done all this work to reorient his economy to make sure that Russia is on a wartime footing, and also to consolidate his power. You know that he's used this war to intensify his authoritarian crackdown, and letting up on the war and embracing a ceasefire will then force him to pivot to domestic concerns, and he doesn't want to do that, you know, he he has noticed that whenever he is aggressive abroad, like when he annexed Crimea, his approval rating goes through the roof. You know, not that we should trust his incredibly high approval ratings, but these fluctuations, I think are,

Golfo Alexopoulos: 21:41

are really telling, and it's evident that he knows that as long as he wages this big, you know, global war against the West and and everything that he does will maintain domestic support. I also want to on the on this subject of authoritarianism. I also want to point out that Putin has been in power for 25 years now, and he needs a war, and he needs enemies, and he needs this kind of situation of heightened alert, this militarism, to stay in power. So his economy is struggling. The interest rates are very high in Russia. Inflation is high, and more and more people are are struggling. There is evidence that that Russians are, you know, not taking vacations, spending, you know, going into more debt. Russian households are so although Ukraine probably can't, can't continue this war much longer. Russia can continue it a little more than Ukraine, but it still can't keep going on forever, and yet, you and yet, Putin needs the war to maintain his power. So we're, we're in this really difficult situation with Putin, I think on the question of the question about the Russia China partnership is really interesting, and I don't know how much you want to get into, you know, like current events, but one of the things that I find striking about the Trump administration's policy is that this 180 degree that is being in many cases, led by Marco Rubio, who, up until a couple of weeks ago, in essence, was one of the biggest detractors of Russia and China and the

Yoan G. Hermida: 23:34

Senate, to what extent are policymakers doing a An analysis of if we pull Russia from China's camp five years down the road, perhaps 10 years down the road, it can help us in the, you know, in Asia Pacific and the dynamic with the rising China,

Golfo Alexopoulos: 23:53

right, right? But didn't. But I think Maria also mentioned a she laid out this kind of scary scenario, that if we pivot entirely to Asia, and let's say we have a frozen conflict in Ukraine, and then we pivot to Asia and we find ourselves in a conflict with China over Taiwan, then Putin will use that as an opportunity to be aggressive again in Europe, Because he'll know that the United States is not doesn't have the capacity to fight a two front war. I know that that many Russia analysts really doubt the West's ability to peel Russia away from China. I know that there's been this discussion about it, but I think that the economies now are are pretty tight. I don't see Europe reopening to to Russian natural gas. I do think that that Putin will be dependent on on China for a long time. So I know that's the hope among American policymakers. Is. But what I'm hearing from Russia analysts is that it's unlikely that we can peel these two

Sarah Brown: 25:08

allies apart. Yes, David Kramer mentioned that during his deep dive discussion, because it was brought up, it's like, oh, is this 40 chest trying to peel Russia away from that Axis of Resistance? And David Kramer was adamantly saying no that they are they're in it together because they have a common, maybe not a common goal, but a common enemy,

Tad Schnaufer: 25:31

right? We can't expect what happened with the sino Russian break of the 1960s where the two regimes were not that economically inclined and they had different ideologies. In this case, you have two authoritarian states which are tied together economically more so now they've been driven together, and it'll be harder to peel them apart. Not to mention that the Russians particularly do not let a hostile China to their south, because the Chinese population on the Chinese side of the border is much higher. The Russians would see that as a much larger threat. They'd much rather have a friendly, or at least a partner, China at the south and focus more on European gains. Well, for my assessment,

Sarah Brown: 26:05

what can I add one more conversation. The theme of this conference was lessons learned from the Russia Ukraine conference. And I think when we started planning this conference, and we were getting the speakers to arrive and to talk about their expertise. I think initially we're thinking about, what are the lessons that the US, military industry is learning from this and I think it was Maria who said, China's watching China's also learning lessons from this conflict, and it is going to apply those lessons. They're going to apply to Taiwan in the South China Seas.

Yoan G. Hermida: 26:42

Yeah. And speaking of that, Dr Marsh, he went out on a limb and said that if the PRC ever invades Taiwan through a fait accompli, he doesn't. He does not see the US responding to that, that invasion in any effective way, which was another moment of the conference that really, you know, struck me white. And we could expect

Tad Schnaufer: 27:02

it the same in Ukraine. If the Russians would have won in a week, that would the Western response would have been more sanctions, and then Putin and the Russians would have said, what do you do? We got Ukraine. Well,

Sarah Brown: 27:11

I think that was the expectation. The expectation was that it was going to be essentially a blitzkrieg. It was going to be a fast conflict, and it was going to be over in a short time. And I think a lot of folks on the international stage are surprised that it's still going on. I mean, I know ceasefires are ceasefire discussion. Negotiations are in discussion right now, but I think folks are surprised that it's lasted three

Tad Schnaufer: 27:32

years, and when, during the report Golfo about the peace, Putin is not likely able to accept a ceasefire. I think from what I've seen, would be, certainly, as long as there's Ukrainian troops on Russian soil, and he's going to probably want the four provinces, which he's, you know, formally, you know, annexed. So probably that's going to be where the lines get frozen, and until, until he can achieve that, he can't accept anything less. Although the victory terms that he set out aren't or were relatively vague before, but it seems like that's pretty much where they're at.

Golfo Alexopoulos: 28:05

But they were pretty maximalist. You know his he always wanted de nazification, which basically means regime change in Ukraine, demilitarization. I mean, now you have a Ukraine that is has developed its own domestic military domestic industry. They're producing drones and they're producing other military equipment, so I don't see Ukraine becoming completely demilitarized, and then, you know, he wants neutrality after being invaded a few times, and not to mention, we're not even discussing the cyber warfare that he has waged on on Ukraine well before that, well before 2014 when they invaded. I just I don't see how Ukrainians are neutral after this experience. I think that they are firmly in the western camp. Now, I think it'll be very hard for them to forget what's happened. Putin is, in my view, deluding himself when he says, Well, you know, we're going to iron out these differences between our two peoples, because we have a close history. Well, absolutely, they do, but it will take generations to heal this wound. So I do think Ukraine is firmly in the EU camp. I think the EU will will embrace Ukraine. NATO, that's a different question, but, but we'll see. I do think there are many countries in Europe that are ready to defend Ukraine.

Tad Schnaufer: 29:43

So with with this groundbreaking discussion we've had here so far, let's turn to the point of the lessons learned. So we've kind of talked about some interesting points. We've kind of set the stage of what was discussed at the conference in general. What are the lessons that you're going to take away from this conference, or that that you did take away from the conference? Reference and what would you recommend? Let's say you did get that chance to be at the National Security Council meeting, and you were going to make recommendations to US or European policy makers. What from this conference, the information you learned, and maybe some follow up news would you recommend? What policies would you recommend for the US going forward? One of

Yoan G. Hermida: 30:18

the things that very concrete things that I took away from the conference is Ukraine's drone production capabilities and how frequent they are able to update not just the software and hardware of the drones in response to new jamming mechanisms from Russia. So I think one of the previous GNSI conferences, there was a panelist that spoke about the replicator program that the DOD has, and what I've read recently about about that is that it hasn't gone as it hasn't progressed as fast as it was hoped. Even though the drones are being produced, they are quickly out of date. Once they they make it off the production line. So one of the things that NATO can learn from from Ukraine is how fast they're producing drones, how to adapt the software the drones to with better evasion capabilities. And that's something that I think you know, defense ministries in all NATO countries and the DOD can definitely learn,

Golfo Alexopoulos: 31:24

I would just add to that, that Russia is a hostile state, if we accept what Maria said, that this is, this is not a new Cold War. It's the Cold War, and it just had a brief period of a brief reprieve, and then it ramped up again. I do think that Putin views the West as an enemy. I think that is I think that those around him feel the same way. Many of his you know the top security officials, maybe not the broader elite, but certainly the top security officials around Putin do believe that. And so I think that we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking that we're that Putin is going to become Boris Yeltsin. You know, he's not. He is who He is. That's, that's one takeaway. Another is something that Peter Pomerantsev noted in his discussion about his book about genocide and how we should be thinking about genocide, I think that this conflict enabled us to record document and identify acts of genocide and war crimes on a scale that we just have not been able to in past conflicts. And so I think that we will learn from this. We will learn how Russia wages war and the degree to which it does not adhere to the Geneva Conventions, I think that that's also a really big lesson. So I mean, we saw this in Syria. We've seen Russian behavior in other conflicts, the way that they deliberately target civilians and use terror as a method of war. But I think that that's certainly a lesson that we take away from from this conflict,

Sarah Brown: 33:24

yeah, and just to for both of y'all points, it's not only the democratization of drones, it's the democracy, democratization of information systems. You know, when the invasion of Crimea was happening, you could literally watch it play out on telegram. So the way that we are getting this information of the war is completely different than I think, has happened in the past. And what's really been interesting is, I think this was also brought up during Peter's conversation, was the Civic information resistance, how it's a very grassroots process happening in Ukraine to combat Russian myths and disinformation. But I think another lesson that the US can learn is that what we what the US does on a global stage in regards to national security and military strategy has ripple effects. Like I don't think anyone could have imagined that if we pulled away from NATO, that NATO would have the stronger response and build together. So I think that there's such a concentration on one event, one conflict at a time, that there it's often ignored how they're interconnected together and how a decision's made from the withdrawal from Afghanistan shows that Putin can invade without consequence,

Golfo Alexopoulos: 34:56

right? I think that it's a very understandable. A concern that Americans have about over extension abroad. It's a totally legitimate concern, I think that we just have to also accept that when we pull out, we create vacuums for bad actors to step in. And so there's a cost, and it's, it's a debate that we need to continue to have, because we want to be engaged, but we don't want to be overextended, and we also want to deter bad actors. So it's, it's a tricky balance. I

Tad Schnaufer: 35:31

think one of the lessons to take away, what I would tell policy makers is, let's say we get a piece tomorrow, there's a cease fire, and we create a DMZ, a demilitarized zone or something, or we have a line of contact is created going to golf. Oh, your point is that this doesn't make Russia a friend. Russia is still an adversary. So you still have a conflict, in a sense. It's not an open war, but you still have a Cold War type scenario. You have an adversary who's right on a border, who's military, aggressive and willing to use force. So you're really not in that much better of a situation. You still need a large military complex, and you need to be able to deter an attack if you want to. And for a US policymaker, or a Western policymaker, a NATO general, whoever it may be, if you do not want Russia to be aggressive, then you have to deter that through force, which would mean 10s of 1000s of troops on whatever front line is agreed for, for peace. And think of it this way. Yes, Putin was wanted Ukraine back into Russia's fold because of cultural, historical means. Yes, he likely wants to shore up his domestic support, but he would not have invaded Ukraine if there was 1000s of US and allied forces there, right? Because it would have been effective deterrence. We know this is true because even Soviet leaders didn't invade Europe. When you have hundreds of 1000s of allied forces, the US perspective, Western perspective, is it worth it? You have to make that decision. Is it worth it, or is this just something we're going to you know, have to sacrifice because we're not willing to fight for this. And that goes to how countries define their interest. Is this, as Ukraine, a vital interest for the United States, meaning you're willing to fight and possibly, you know, engage in a world war three type scenario. If it's not, then going half measures actually doesn't help the situation, really, either, which is slow, incremental, supplying the force. Yes, it makes the war last longer, but you're not, you're not getting any political objective achieved other than a stalemate. So you have to, as a policy maker, what I would tell them is you have to decide what you want, and then you're going to have to make a hard decision, because if you decide we don't want Russia to invade anywhere else in Europe, then you're going to need to put 10s of 1000s of troops on the border. That's the only way that you're going to ensure that Russia does not take aggressive physical actions. You're still going to have cyber issues. You're still going to have hybrid threats, but if you want to stop large scale conventional war, it means you need to have the ability to deter it. So before we end up with our last segment of the podcast, why don't we discuss a little bit about we had an excellent panel of student presenters discussing topics related to the Russian war in Ukraine. There's a lot of lessons. There a lot of interesting points. What do you guys think about that panel?

Golfo Alexopoulos: 38:04

So I thought that the panel with the students was excellent, and I thought in particular, it was especially interesting because it shed light on the conversation that we were having at the conference regarding Russia's war and the lessons learned. I also thought that there was significant overall student engagement in the panel and themes that were relevant to students. For example, Admiral John Kirby spoke extensively about his time in the White House as National Security Council spokesperson, and how he got into the field. What should students take away from that? Quite a few of my students told me that what, what Admiral Kirby said, really made an impression on on them. So I thought that that was a hugely positive moment in the conference. Was when, when John Kirby was speaking about his own career trajectory and what advice he had for students, yeah,

Yoan G. Hermida: 39:09

on the student presentations as one of the presenters, I must say that the TED Talk style format was very engaging. It it was for me as a presenter, it facilitated the points I needed to make across or wanted to make across, much more than if it had been like, say, a panel discussion. So yes, kudos to that format. I think it should be replicated, not just with students, but maybe in future conferences with other presenters. And some of the student presentations were very technical. The gentleman talking about the drones, and the various nomenclatures of the drones, and how the Iranians were producing these drones and shipping them to Ukraine, that was fascinating. And it showed really a level of expertise in in his research that was very surprising in a. Positive way. Obviously,

Sarah Brown: 40:01

yes, and I'm going to approach the student TED Talks and research presentations from a different aspect. They were all phenomenal, yours included. But I think it shows that GNSI, with the future strategist program, is providing an avenue, or platform, I should say, for students at the graduate and undergraduate level to present their research and areas of interest. And that is so important, especially at a university, we need to have these type of opportunities for our learners, because not only is it professional development, but it also shows the audience what the future policy makers are thinking, where they're coming from, what they're interested in, what, not what their belief systems are, but how are they're going to approach problems in future policy issues. So it is we are going to have these in future conferences. The format may change. It may be different. I think we did posters one year. But I think the audience, and I think the students really enjoyed the TED Talks presentation, and I look forward to enabling that in the future

Tad Schnaufer: 41:10

well. And to wrap up with that, again, amazing conference, a lot of great speakers, including some of our students here at USF, to wrap up, if you were to bump into a policymaker in the hallway tomorrow that was not at our conference. How would you what would you tell them from the conference that you know you miss this and you really need to look into it, or you miss this lesson learned? And I just want to highlight that for you. So what do you think from the conference you would tell a policy maker if you bumped into a bumped into them in an elevator or something of that nature, and you had to give them a quick bite, size, digestible policy recommendation from the conference to your point.

Yoan G. Hermida: 41:47

Had about the power dynamics in Europe. One of the lessons that we need to learn from from not just the conference, but also the conflict, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, is that when the US abandons Europe, bad things happen, right? We saw it during the isolationist period before the First World War. We saw it in the 20s and 30s. And I don't think the US should be in a position or should withdraw the number of forces that the present administration is talking about. Nor do I think that it sets a good precedent for the liberal international order, or whatever is left of it, to cede territory, to Putin or to abandon, quote, unquote, abandon European allies. I think it would be a mistake, and if I ran into a policymaker, I would tell them to, and if they're part of the administration, I would tell them to reverse, reverse course as quickly as they can.

Golfo Alexopoulos: 42:49

Yeah, I I think that picking up on that, I would, I would say that that you can't focus on the China threat without tackling the Russia threat as well, and that those are connected, because these are authoritarian regimes that have expansionist motivations and ambitions. And I think that what we do in Ukraine will impact Chinese behavior. China is watching, and if we let Ukraine be absorbed by Russia, well, China will interpret that as a green light to absorb Taiwan.

Sarah Brown: 43:31

So if I met a policy maker in the elevator, what I would try to pitch is it's not it's not a sexy topic, but it's logistics. It's supply chain and how I know there are current programs in DOD that are trying to keep up with the innovation, especially with drone technology and software technology. Yet so much money is going into legacy systems, such as aircraft carriers F 16, so there needs to be a hybridization of continuing to build up those legacy systems, but also be innovative at a rapid pace, where we can implement these new technologies and not lose our competitive edge in a more kinetic setting.

Tad Schnaufer: 44:16

Excellent, excellent. The point I would make is that all obviously, we're trying to solve these tough situations, but the first question we should ask is, how do we don't how do we not end up in these type of situations? How do we set the course so that we avoid catastrophes instead of trying to fix them after they've started? So again, going back to either effective deterrence, for example, in war, but also, just like you would pre stage equipment. You know, we're here in Florida, we pre stage get ready for hurricanes. We're ready for them when they happen. We're not waiting for a hurricane to hit and then figuring it out. Foreign policy needs to be able to be ahead of issues and start thinking like that. But that means going back to your point of, you know, non sexy policy. That means having true either, you know, if we're trying to just hurt conflict, having troops staged and. Uh, Korea, for example, for 70 years, and they're just there in case of war. I mean, that's not adventurous. It's not, you know, you're spending a lot of money. And the problem with deterrence as a policy is that you can't measure how successful it is, other than nothing happens, and that's a hard policy to sell to taxpayers. Hey, nothing's happening, so everything's good. Well, the problem going to Sarah's earlier point is it's not happening in a vacuum. We're paying for troops around the world, but at home, our egg prices are going up. Different things are going up. So it's not all stagnant. And another piece is that going to golf with your point about you know, they always tell you, as a leader and leader training, that your people who are working for you always you look looking to you. They're watching you. They're seeing what you do. Or even you hear this with parents, right? You know, your kids are watching what you do. They're taking that example. But in the international stage, it's the same thing. Signals are being sent with every action, whether if it's something you've done, and a country can do something Latin America, but the world sees it. It doesn't matter where it's happening, and they're going to make inferences from that based off of their current policy advisors and their current information, which will, by definition, be imperfect, then they'll likely lead them to sub optimal policy. So being conscious of that is another big takeaway I think the conference taught us. So with all that, I want to thank you all so much for your attendance today and at the conference, as well as thoughtful insights. And it was an amazing conference. Thank you so much for the support and planning with it as well and each of your individual contributions.

Yoan G. Hermida: 46:27

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

Glenn Beckmann: 46:37

What a great conversation today, as we look back at Tampa summit five, digging into key observations and takeaways on the Russia, Ukraine war, which continues to make headlines as the two countries, along with leaders from the US and Europe, continue to work towards a resolution to the largest land war in Europe since World War Two, a conflict that has already claimed, by some estimates, nearly 1 million casualties in the three years since Russia invaded Ukraine, thanks to our guests today, Dr Tad schnaufer and Sarah Brown from GNSI, Dr golfel, Alex Apollos from iris and Johan hermita from the future strategist program. Next week on at the boundary, we're going to kick off a discussion centered on critical natural and national resources, we'll have a special guest for the podcast as we talk about increasing global strategic competition for these resources, and how countries are competing and will compete for and secure these resources that are so critical for the technology we all take for granted in our everyday lives. We recently published a decision brief on this very topic. If you're so inclined, go check it out on our website. It will make a great jumping off point for next week's podcast that's going to wrap up this episode of at the boundary. Each new episode will feature global and national security issues we found to be worthy of discussion and attention. I'm Glenn Beckman, thanks for listening today. We'll see you next week at the boundary.