Is Yemen Losing the War Against the Houthis?

In this episode of At the Boundary, guest Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a Yemen expert of the Middle East Institute, joins GNSI’s own Dr. Armand Mahmoudian to unpack the rise of the Houthis and their growing impact on regional and global security.

The conversation explores the Houthis' ideological roots, inspired by the Iranian Revolution, and their strategic objectives—from dominating Yemen to targeting holy sites and calling for the destruction of Israel. With military backing and training from Iran, the Houthis have become a key player in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

The episode also delves into recent U.S. military strikes aimed at stopping Houthi attacks on global shipping, their ties with extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, and the involvement of major powers like Russia and China.

What’s next for Yemen—and what does it mean for the world? Tune in for expert insights and critical analysis of one of today’s most volatile security flashpoints.

At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

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The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.

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Transcript

Jim Cardoso: 0:12

Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to a special episode of at the boundary, the podcast from the global and national security Institute at the University of South Florida. I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Director for GNSI, and your host for at the boundary. Today on the podcast, our special guest will be nadwa al daswari, an Associate Fellow from the Middle East Institute. She's a leading expert on Yemen emerging as one of the most volatile countries in that region. She's also a veteran researcher, conflict analyst and policy advisor who spent over 12 years in the field, working on Yemeni tribes. Today, she'll be talking with GNSI Research Fellow, Dr Armand mahmudian GNSI resident fellow focusing on the Middle East. As you are no doubt aware, Yemen has been front and center on the world stage the past three weeks following the successful conduct of military strikes by US forces against Houthi targets. While these strikes were somewhat overshadowed by the news of signal chat being used to pass sensitive information, the long term strategic significance is huge. The Houthis have been wreaking havoc on global shipping in and around the Bab al Mandeb and the Red Sea, and this was the strongest response yet by the United States. Let's turn over now to Armen and his conversation with nadwa al daswari. You

Arman Mahmoudian: 1:42

thank you Jim. Thank you for your kind introduction, and once again, thank you nadwa, I want to thank you on behalf of our team at the Global national security Institute to access for accepting our invitation. It's a great opportunity, and I sincerely appreciate it. But before going forward and talking in depth about the Houthis, recent interaction with the United States, their communication and connection with the Iranian. I want to kind of start the conversation with a historical background. You're a Yemen expert. You have dedicated most of your professional life to study Yemen. And I want to take ask your take or insight that will it all begin. What are hooties. What's the historical background behind them? What constitutes their social base? What is their ideological manifesto? Basically, who are these people? Thank you so much for having me. Armin, it's good to be here. That's a big question, but it's also the answer is simple.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 2:41

Where it all began, in terms of the Houthis rise, and now how they've evolved into a regional actor that attacks ship in the Red Sea. Well, the Houthis are zaidis, in particular. Jarodi Zaydi. Zaydis are known to be relatively moderate, but Jarod yzaddies are not moderate. Jehudi zaydis believe that the nation should be ruled by an imam who is a descendant of Prophet Muhammad Yemen was ruled by the Imamate, theocracy, until they were overthrown in 1962 so part of what what the Houthis want to do is to is to reinstate the Imamate. But that's the most domestically. The Houthis are also inspired by the Iranian Revolution, and they've, over the past 30 years, they've established strong relationship with Iran and they've imported much of the Iranian ideology and sort of mechanisms into the country, and that's where they became a transnational movement with aspirations that are beyond Yemen borders. So what is the Houthis ideology? So short term? What the Houthis want to do? They want to control Yemen. They want to expand into the region. Medium Term, they want to take the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. And in long term, they want to destroy Israel. They want to capture Jerusalem, where they want to establish an Islamic govern, governance of global nature, and that is that ideology is rooted in Islamic fundamentalism, both Shia and Sunnah. The only difference is that for Shia, it's the 12 Imam who's who went in hiding in the eighth century, at five year old, who would emerge at the end of days, to march the armies towards Jerusalem, but for zaydis, like the Houthis, it would be born out of Prophet Muhammad's bloodline. And some of the Houthi supporters and the ideologues around Abd Al mak and Houthi Some say that Abd Al makhuti himself, Abdul. Is the leader of the movement. Believe that he is that figure the name of so the figure is known in Islamic in Islam, the figures is known as Al Mahdi. Is the is this sort of Messianic savior who will emerge in the end of days and restore justice into the world. But it starts with taking Jerusalem.

Arman Mahmoudian: 5:29

So it's kind of a messy Hall interview. Correct you mentioned about the Yemen being ruling by the Imam. It's by then up until 1962 if I stand correct and correct me if I'm wrong. So part of what they want is actually restoring the previous influence that the community used to have, if I can, if I'm getting it correct. And it's kind of quite fascinating by concept, because when it comes to the communities, the general understanding is that it's a affiliation of the Shi'ism zaidis. But also there are arguments out there. And if I have a feeling that you know better, I'm sure you know whether I want, like to take your take on it is that the Houthis are, aside being a try a Shi and an ideological community, there are also tribal in structure. There are tribal society. There is a great deal of bonds between different Zaydi tribe, which Hutus comes from, of it, or they kind of get the leg into the rise of the Houthis movement. I would like to know, what is your insight on it? Is it tribal infrastructure? Is it a tribal community, or it's a sole ideological mind should be, I said on the Z

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 6:43

so the Houthis are not a tribe. The Houthis are a clan. The Houthis are. Say it's Hashemites, meaning they are. They come at the top of the social strata as descendants of the Prophet. That's where how they identify themselves. So they're not tribes. They are Hashima saints, because that's that's the class they belong to. Tribes are different, and you're right. I mean, Zaidi tribes in the north, they identify as Zaidi tribes, but it's not an ideological identification. Zaidi tribes, like tribes all over Yemen, are pretty pragmatic, their anti ideology, but they identify as Zaydi tribes. It's, it's more of a geographic identity, since they belong to the north, where the Zaydi Imamate ruled for hundreds of years, and they became zaidis. It became, they became known as the Zaidi tribes, but it's not an ideological identity. And so and then zaydis and for the most part, I mean, throughout Yemen's history, zaydis and Shafi is shapiros Are the moderate version of Sunni, zaidis are the moderate version of Shia. Have coexisted in Yemen. There's never been any secretarian conflict of that sort. Most of the conflicts are rooted in grievances and sort of political differences and competition over power and resources, rather than secretarianism. So in terms of the Houthis relationship with the tribes, the Houthis, so the Houthis have been trying to have built an extremely repressive system, and part of that system includes dismantling the tribal structure, because the tribal structure have always prevented the central government or The regimes from oppressing people and the tribes in Yemen are armed. They're independent, they're strong, and so part of why the Houthis want to dismantle the tribal system, and they've been trying to do that for the past 10 years through different methods, and I can talk about that, is to ensure that the tribes are not a threat to them, while at the same time exploiting the tribes for their own purposes, for example, to recruit fighters, to indoctrinate the anger population in the tribes, and so on and so forth. But there is no bond between the tribes and the Houthis right now. The relationship is sometimes transactional. Sometimes it's, you know, for the tribes, it's this, they don't have an option. They cannot really go against the Houthis. But to a large extent, the Houthis are deeply, deeply resented by the tribes because of their repressive nature and because they have really upset at the tribal structure, but also they violated a lot of the tribal codes and values and ethics. Wow.

Arman Mahmoudian: 9:50

Well, thank you. I want to make another pivot back to your initial remarks you mentioned about what is being influenced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the revolution in 19. 29 which Iranian sources suggested. Right after the revolution, a group of delegation of the Houthis went to the Iran or the zaydis, and they met with Ayatollah Khomeini. After the Iranian revolution, it seems that Iran has been trying to assimilate or incorporate the zaydis version of the Shi'ism, or the way that they practicing the Shia, or the theology into the tulva or Ashia or Tul Imam Shia, we kind of witness a gradual difference, or, you know, in the way that the Hutu is mourn for them, almost in or Muharram, we kind of witnessed. It's kind of evolving. It's not as dissimilar quite as they used to do, or that they don't go through the measures or way of the performance that they used to do it 50 years ago. What they do today for the mourning of the Muharram or some other also religious traditions, is quite similar to what the Iranians do, the 12 in Yemenis do. I would like to ask you about the depth of the Iran's today, in influence of Iran's today in Yemen and over the Hutus, the role that the Iranian played, if they played any, in Houthis takeover in and then the role that Iranian played in sponsoring and supporting the to sustain Houthis role in northern Yemen.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 11:30

So in terms of ideology, the Houthis and Iran's ideology align, but not 100% in fact, traditional Shia scholars in Iran considers 80s atheists and the Houthis. They ridicule the Shia sort of Twelver theory. And I would say the relationship is more ideological, ideological slash. Pragmatic Iran, certainly, ASEM Soleimani saw an opportunity in the Houthis to infiltrate the Arabian Peninsula and sort of threaten Saudi Arabia, while at the same time, you know, up in a gate to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The Houthis owe their rise to the Iranians, to the to the to the IRGC in particular. So Iran has been investing in the Houthis since the 1980s the father of the Houthi movement, leader and the founder, Hussein Houthi, both spent time in Qom in Iran in the 80s. Abdul hoti himself also spent time in in southern Lebanon with Hezbollah, and also in Iran in the 1990s and and that relationship, the Hezbollah commanders and IRGC commanders have been present in Yemen long before the war. So, for example, a Bucha Larry, who was sanctioned by the US in 2008 was in Yemen. Had been in Yemen before the Houthis took over the capital. So Iran was involved in the Houthis plot to expand throughout Yemen, including to take the capital. I think when people say Iran was upset that the Houthis took over Sana'a, I think that's just, that's just Iran feeding people, you know, misinformation. I think Iran might have been surprised that Sana'a fell into the hands of the Houthis easily, but they were not upset about it. So since 2014 Iran sent hundreds, and that's this is Iranian officials saying hundreds of experts to Yemen to help the Houthis. Iran has helped the Houthis expand militarily throughout Yemen. So military strategizing, military operations, they've trained them. It has helped the Houthis weapons, including ballistic missiles, drones, but also had the Houthis develop weapon manufacturing technology. Iran has been involved in the Houthis cross border attacks, and in fact, Iran IRGC commanders on the ground have are, have managed cross border attacks, including attacks against Saudi Arabia, but also Red Sea attacks. So you know, the Houthis also run the country. The Houthis have established this highly repressive police, police state that runs the country through a jihadist council that is led by Abdul Melik al ho they was the leader of the Houthi movement. His first aid is an IRGC commander, and the deputy aide is a Hezbollah commander. That's how Iran is involved with the Houthis I will borrow so the. Yeah, the Iran model is Iran is managing the Houthis, but Iran does not micromanage the Houthis. They're not involved in the routine, sort of day to day, sort of small activities. I would borrow a term that a friend of mine said last week, Iran's hands are not on the steering wheel. Iran is the steering wheel. It's, it's, it's not accurate to say that the Houthis are independent of Iran. They're not, but they can be in time.

Arman Mahmoudian: 15:35

So if I stand correct when you're saying this, you're suggesting that why did the relationship between Iran and Hutus is not necessarily a patron client relationship, but it's a somewhat of a partnership with a high degree of Reliance from who is being the junior partner on the Iranian as the main sponsor and the senior partner. That's, that's the way that you're describing the dynamic, I think

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 16:01

it's still a patron client, but it's it's moving towards becoming, it's becoming a partnership, and I think in time, it might become full partnership. But right now, IRGC commanders are on the ground supporting the Houthis in every step, including the Houthis expansion into the Horn of Africa.

Arman Mahmoudian: 16:25

And what are the factors that they are forcing this involved evolution from the patron client to the partnership.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 16:33

I think Iran has been under tremendous pressure, especially recently, since the Trump since President Trump came to office, and I think for Iran, it would, it would help them if they gradually sort of enabled the Houthis to take charge, like right now in the Horn of Africa, Iran has helped the Houthis forge relationships with AQAP in Yemen, with Somali al Qaeda and Shabab in Somalia and ISIS in Somalia, also Somali pirates. But the Houthis information indicate that the Houthis are now sort of are in charge of managing this relationship. We're seeing an evolution towards sort of Iran, Iranians, almost not quiet, but almost phasing out in the Houthis kind of taking over that part of the operation. But I think that's just not completely allowing the Houthis to be in charge, but for Iran to become or to have more like plausible deniability,

Arman Mahmoudian: 17:43

and I'm very glad that you mentioned that relationships that or connection that the Hutus are building with the Somalian al Shabaab and other regional actors, because that was actually one of the questions that I wanted to ask you. It's there have been many reports about the relationship between Houthis and Al Shabaab, and also the pirates and other actors, even the Institute of Rusi has made, I believe, an extensive and reliable study, not a paper talking about the Houthis trying to build their own network of access, of resistance. I would like to ask you that what the dynamic or the nature of the Houthis have specifically speaking with actors in Somalia, pirates and the Al Shabaab, what's the ultimate goal here from them? What is driving and radical Sunni group and a radical Shia group to cooperate? Is it purely based on the mutual perception that they have of the United States, or it's something bigger here,

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 18:42

that's part of it. I think radical Shia and radical Sunni ideology align when it comes to Israel, when it comes to, you know, this messianic vision, the destruction of Israel, capturing Jerusalem and establishing global sort of Islamic State or Islamic government. But for now, the goals are the same, which is pushing the US out of the region, and also a lot of it has to do with strengthening, establishing and strengthening smuggling routes, illicit trade money has a lot to do with it. So revenue streams, for example, one of the benefits that the Houthis are reaping in Somalia is access to mining and and the Houthis have been training al Shabaab in building sophisticated weapons and bombs, the Houthis have provided al Qaeda with drones that used to attack Yemeni government forces in the south and hundreds of Al Shabaab al Shabaab militants have been sent, were sent to Yemen to trip and were trained. By the Houthis. Some of them went back home, and some of them were sent to Iran for additional training. So yes, the Houthis are forging their own Axis of Resistance across the Horn of Africa, but Iran is part and parcel of that. I'm

Arman Mahmoudian: 20:20

very glad that you mentioned about what the Houthis provide and what their incentives are. The Israelis think tanks. Last week, think was Alma Think Tank published a very, very interesting study, and very interesting, to some extent, of a news arguing that Iranian are developing new facilities in Sudan and trying to basically establish a new route to the Lebanon via the Red Sea to arm and supplies the hezbollahs. I wonder that if you think, and I understand that's a very hard question to ask, we don't know yet, so grounds are not solid on that front. But I wonder that if you think the Houthis would play any role in developing such an alternative route to supply and arm Hezbollah,

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 21:12

I think yes, so the Houthis are Iran's lost, standing proxy, and there's the Iraqi militias, but their situation is a little different. The Houthis have much more access and much more potential. And the Horn of Africa, and in Africa in general, is a fertile land for Iran to establish bases, to establish routes, to establish the line, lines. So and the Houthis have the hobbies have been all over Africa. The Houthis have been in Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, some reports also that indicate that they've been also in Libya. And so I wouldn't be surprised if these, if these reports are accurate, in fact, they're most likely accurate, as Iran is trying to compensate for the massive loss it endured. You know, Hezbollah weakening, and also the loss of the Assad regime. Well,

Arman Mahmoudian: 22:12

I think we discuss quite fairly, given to our timings, about the regional actors, relations with this, Somalian pirates and Al Shabaab and Al hayde. But I think it would be unfair if he didn't we don't discuss the international actors. A while ago, I believe it was in october 2024, Wallace Street Journal made a report in which they made an argument that Russia has been providing the Houthis with the targeting data, the navigation, the route of the ships, and prior to that, also being various reports from different Institute, not only one making a claim which seems to be accurate, in my view, correct me, you are the expert of the matter that the hoot is also been Quite growingly avoiding targeting the Chinese or Chinese owned or ships, I would like to ask your first, what do you think, or what do you know of the Hooters relationship with these two international actors that you can share with us? And second, what are the motives that they have to have a relationship with the Houthis, if they have any specifically regarding Russia, because for China, we can understand it's a commercial estate trade is a primary issue for them. So they want to have a maritime after resilience. Maritime resiliency, let's see Russia's motives. On the other hand, is a bit vague, so you can explain this for us, for our audience, I would very much appreciate

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 23:43

it. Yeah, this relationship is beneficial for both the Houthis and also Russia and China. And the Houthis are also sending fighters to Russia to fight in Ukraine. It makes sense, because for the Houthis, they get the expertise, they get, the weapons they get, the technology. For Russia, expanding influence into Yemen is hugely beneficial, because it means undermining us influence in the Red Sea and in the Middle East. So that's what, and that also includes access to the Horn of Africa and all the benefits that come with it. Again, the holies are not just focused on Yemen or Somalia. They are, along with Iran. Iran is part of this too. They're they're all focusing on expanding influence into Africa, into the Horn of Africa. And Africa, we've seen Iran increase influence in countries like Burkina, Faso, Mali, Sudan and so Russia will benefit from all all this, the access that comes with these relationships, whether in terms of. Of you know, strengthening economic ties, political ties, security, but also, more importantly, you know, competing with the US in that region as US influence we've seen is fading. And I mean in terms of China, what? China also buys 90% of Iran's oil, and that goes, half of that goes to the RGC, and that funds their operations in Yemen. So it's indirect funding to the Houthis. But at the same time, the the US has sanctioned, recently, they've sanctioned several Houthi leaders and Houthi affiliates for smuggling weapons from China into the Houthis, and also smuggling weapons and military grade materials to the Houthis from from Russia. So I think it only makes sense for these two international actors to build alliance with the Houthis, to compete with the US.

Arman Mahmoudian: 26:01

Yeah, that's that's very interesting, specifically regarding Russians, because I think it's fair to say that historically speaking, Russians were interested in that region even during the Soviet Union. They made some on and off attempts. But speaking of the international powers, you brought United States, and it seems United States is in the new period of time with the Hutus, new generation of the clash with the Hutus, specifically speaking, after the October 7 that the Hutus, for some reason, got involved, which I want to first ask you a question about, why they got involved. Why they decided to interrupt? Was it the pressure of the Iranian or an independent decision. And second, how so far United States handle the Houthis naval rebels, or let's say that disruptive actions in the Red Sea, whether effective and effective. Or how do you evaluate the US actions then

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 27:01

the US is attacking Houthi targets because the Houthis have been attacking ships in the Red Sea. I think the Trump administration has made that objective very clear. They want to degrade the Houthis capabilities in order to prevent them from attacking ships. Part of that is an indirect message to Iran, or a message to Iran, but, but it's, it is to prevent the Houthis from attacking ships. In itself, the attacks have been, I was told, or I'm told, have been very, very precise. They have degraded some of the Houthis capabilities. We don't know, it's too early to know how much, but it also disrupted the Houthis communication systems, because it targeted communication systems, and it also killed many of their leaders or commanders at the operational level, especially those that are dealing with the drones and missiles. So it did for the first time. I am hearing for the first time, the Houthis believe that they find they they face real war. Whatever happened before, before the March, 15 attacks, was not really, did not really put the Houthis under pressure. Now they feel that they're under real military pressure. Now, would that really destroy the Houthis ability to attack ships in the future? I think air strikes by themselves are not going to because of one reason, the Houthis have proven before that they can withstand airstrikes. In fact, they've they have suffered six years of airstrikes by the Saudi led coalition and emerged even stronger. And the US cannot bomb the Houthis forever. I mean, it's expensive. It's not sustainable. What the Houthis are relying on is the passage of time. They can wait, and then, when the US stops, they can restock their weapons, the weapon storage through the massive smuggling routes that they have established with the help of Iran. I'm told that for every ship that gets interdicted, 100 ships pass. Wow, yeah, I'm told by professionals in smuggling and arms smuggling. I mean, I've heard from them. So the Houthis will restock and just wait, and they will learn from this. They will adapt, and they will come back stronger. So the only way to neutralize the Houthi threat once and for all is to work with the Yemeni Government, provide them with the necessary support that they need to defeat the Houthis through ground operation. And I'm not suggesting that we, as the US that we send boots on the ground you. Yemenis don't need boots on the ground. The Yemeni government needs support. We have in Yemen there are the government has about 200,000 fighters across the various front lines, and they're eager to defeat the Houthis. They just have never really got the support they needed to do that. So if the US administration wants to and if the US government wants to achieve its objective in dismantling the Houthis capabilities to resume attacks against ships in the future. They need to team up with the Yemeni government, and they need to support Yemeni government forces to take the Houthis down.

Arman Mahmoudian: 30:48

Thank you, nadwa. I'm very glad that you brought future. We discussed the past, the roads, the roots of the Houthis. We discussed present. And now I want to conclude this podcast with one final question, and ask about the future. What future holds for Yemen and who it is if the current status quo continues to be sustained and survive, how do you see the future of

Nadwa Al-Dawsari: 31:13

Yemen? Broadly speaking, I can think about two scenarios. Scenario number one, the US and the Saudi led coalition partner with the with the Yemeni Government, support the Yemeni government for the Yemeni forces to defeat the Houthis and then transition into post war. It's not going to be a walk in the park, but it will give Yemen a chance at peace, and, you know, to move forward into a brighter future. The second scenario is the US relying on airstrikes, and then, you know, for a few months, and then stops. And then for the Houthis to wait for a year or two or three, and then come back stronger, take over all Yemen, expand into the Horn of Africa and Africa, and then present a nightmare to the US and the West and also regional allies.

Arman Mahmoudian: 32:14

Nadu, sorry once again. Thank you for your insights. It's been a pleasure to have your unpacking podcast. I want to thank you on behalf of also our team at the Global national security Institute. It truly was a pleasure. Thank you.

Unknown: 32:27

Thank you for having me.

Jim Cardoso: 32:36

We hope you enjoyed this timely conversation about Yemen, the attacks on Houthi targets and the global effects of that chain of events. I anticipate a lot more news to come on that conflict, and now you've got a good baseline to follow future events. Thanks to our special guest today, nadwa aldaswari, an Associate Fellow with the Middle East Institute. Thanks as well to Dr Amman mahmudian GNSI, Research Fellow and resident expert on the Middle East, a regular episode about the boundary drops on Monday, and we look forward to welcoming David Kramer, the executive director of the George W Bush Institute. But for today, thanks for listening. If you liked the podcast, please share with your colleagues and network you can follow genus sign or LinkedIn and X accounts at USF, underscore GNSI, and check out our website as well, at usf.edu/gnsi, where you can also subscribe to our monthly newsletter that's going to wrap up this special Episode of at the boundary, whether a regular weekly or breaking special, every episode will feature global and national security issues we found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall, just worth talking about. I'm Jim Cardoso, and we'll see you at the boundary.