The Hidden Risks of a Ukraine Ceasefire

What’s next in the Russia-Ukraine war, and how should the U.S. respond? In this episode of At the Boundary, we listen in on a critical conversation between Dr. Arman Mahmudian, GNSI Research Fellow, and David Kramer, Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute.

Together, they examine the current state of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, explore the political landscape, and assess the potential for a ceasefire. Kramer outlines Russia’s continued aggression, the vital role of U.S. military and economic support, and the importance of long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.

The discussion also covers Ukraine’s battlefield innovations, the risks of premature negotiations, and strategic policy recommendations—including enhanced sanctions, seizing Russian assets, and maintaining pressure to deter future Russian actions.

🎧 Tune in for expert analysis on the war’s trajectory, U.S. foreign policy, and what’s at stake for global security.

At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.

The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.

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Transcript

Jim Cardoso: 0:00

Jim. Hello everyone. Welcome to this week's episode of at the boundary, the podcast from the global and national security Institute at the University of South Florida. I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Director for GNSI, and your host for at the boundary. Today on the podcast, we're going to listen in on a conversation between GNSI Research Fellow, Dr Arman mahmudian and David Kramer. He's the Executive Director of the George W Bush Institute, and they're going to spend a little time talking about the Russia, Ukraine war, or bring them into the studio. However, want to mention a couple things. The GNSI YouTube channel is the perfect place to see some of the great analysis being produced by our team. Last week, we dropped the latest episode of what's really happening with executive director, retired Marine Corps General Frank McKenzie, that video already has nearly 10,000 views, as it generated a ton of engagement, it provides a four star General's view on future nuclear conflict. So you want to listen in and be part of that. Also in the next couple of weeks, look for the videos from last week's cyber frontier Summit. It was the first conference hosted by our student organization, the future strategist program. Easiest thing is just to subscribe to our channel. Cost nothing, and you'll be notified whenever new content is added to the channel. Speaking of great conferences, it's been a little over a month since we hosted GNSI Tampa summit five focused on the Russia, Ukraine, war lessons for future conflicts. One of our featured speakers at the conference was David Kramer, who heads up the George W Bush Institute. Prior to that, Kramer spent time at the Green School of International Public Affairs at Florida International University. He also spent over 20 years in Washington, DC, taking leadership roles at the McCain institute for international leadership, the State Department during the George W Bush administration, and a host of other high profile roles, Kramer sat down recently with our Dr Arman mahmudian. Over to you,

Arman Mahmoudian: 2:20

Mr. Kramer, once again, thank you for being here with us. I want to start with the current atmosphere and political climate in a globally speaking as you know, there is a boat pressure on Ukraine to reach a cease fire or conclude the war, and also there is a rooting internationally speaking for Ukraine to continue war, as long as it comes to the terms that can reach a deal or cease fire favorable for itself. The we have noticed. We have witnessed the interaction between President Zelensky and President Trump earlier on in February and then the Riyadh meeting. And also some polls suggest that there are factions of the Ukrainian city civilians who are rooting for the peace or seize fall. But the polls also don't suggest that there are, they are the majority of the Ukrainian population. We also have seen different proposals from the European partners, which is not quite necessarily in the alignment with the current administration of the United States regarding the war in Ukraine. But the thing that I want to ask you is that we want. I want to start this conversation with an assumption. An assumption is that which might be a reality anytime soon, that Ukraine accepts the pressure or the suggestion for the peace deal and reach a deal with the Russia, even based on the current circumstances and the status quo of the battlefield and the ground, assuming that Russia would keep the Crimean, other occupied territory in South and East so the question is, what would be the viable options for the Ukrainian government? And let's say that the international community, specifically speaking the free world, the West, primarily speaking United States, to guarantee the security of the Ukraine its territorial integrity, the remaining of this territorial integrity and sovereignty in the post cease fire or peace deal?

David Kramer: 4:07

Well, first, it's great to be with you, and it was also a great opportunity. At least. I participated remotely in the conference at USF, and I was really pleased to be able to do that. I'm sorry I wasn't there in person, but I would say that this situation has become more complicated than it was, and it was already rather complicated, and yet at the same time, the war is rather simple to understand. Let me start from the premise that Russia is the guilty party here. There is no question about it. There are few conflicts. Is clear cut in my mind is this one. Russia launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 but it also launched an initial invasion of Ukraine in February of 2014 this goes back now more than a decade when after the Euromaidan. One revolution, or Revolution of Dignity, as Ukrainians call it, in 2013 2014 led to the pro Russian Ukrainian president fleeing power, Viktor Yanukovych, and going to Russia. And then Russia, of course, moved into Crimea, where it already had some forces launched an illegal referendum that virtually no country recognized, and then moved into the Donbas region of Ukraine. More than 14,000 Ukrainians were killed between that time in February 2014 until February of 2022 and that history, I think recent history, is very important to understand what has been happening in the past three years. Here now we are facing a situation where there is no question that Ukraine has been facing pressure from the United States, most recently, in particular, to move ahead with a cease fire arrangement. The Ukrainians have indicated they are prepared and willing to do so. The problem is, and has been Russia. It has been Putin who has not shown a willingness to engage in a 30 day Cease fire. And so we also, I think, are seeing now an unfortunate division between the United States and the rest of Europe, where the French and British and German and other leaders in Europe are demonstrating, at least these days stronger solidarity with Ukraine than the United States is right now. And just recently, we have seen a signs that while Ukraine has agreed to this 30 day ceasefire, Putin, won't he instead wants a Black Sea moratorium so that Russia's Navy can move without fear of being hit by Ukrainian forces. And so Putin is now the one clearly, who is the obstacle to any 30 day Cease fire. And as Secretary Rubio said after the meetings a week or so ago in Saudi Arabia with the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians agreed to the 30 day ceasefire. The ball is in the Russians court, and the Russians now are basically punting that ball away.

Arman Mahmoudian: 7:11

You mentioned about that. The Russians are the what the party that kind of play, the party that not play along, and they are the cause of postponing the ceasefire. I want to ask you a question before going forward that let's say that either Russia, or even Ukraine itself, despite the international pressure, specifically speaking from the United States, decides to continue the war. My question is that, what are the odds, or what are the chances of the Ukraine in continuing the war with Russia, without the United States support, or United States support, as it used, the level of support that United said they used to project during the last couple of years. Do you think on a battlefield, on the ground, they do have a standard chance, or situation can go very severe for them if they want to continue the war on their own?

David Kramer: 7:59

That would be incredibly unfortunate development, if it unfolded us. Support has been critical for Ukraine's efforts to fend off Russian invading forces. For Ukraine to be able to regain control of most of its territory, there's now about 18% of Ukrainian territory that is currently occupied by Russian forces, it has been critical for Ukraine's ability to launch strikes deeper inside Russia, and that took a long time from the previous US administration to get agreement to allow the Ukrainians to use longer range missile systems from the United States to Hit Russian targets. So us support is extremely important. But should the United States decide that it is no longer going to support Ukraine militarily? I think the Ukrainians will continue to fight, and I think it will apply additional pressure on our European allies to increase their support for Ukraine. Just this week, we've seen meetings between Zelensky and European leaders in support of Ukraine, offers of reassurance force. It obviously would be vastly better if the United States were involved, not necessarily having our our troops on the ground, but providing air cover, intelligence support and other kinds of assistance to that force, so that it would be formidable enough to deter any further Russian aggression. The Ukrainians are fighting for their land, for their freedom and for their lives, and as long as the Russian forces are on their territory, I think you will see strong support among the majority of Ukrainians to continue to defend their territory and push back on Russian forces. Most surveys in Ukraine have shown little support for territorial concessions and compromises. They don't like the idea of signing agreements with the Russians, as long as Russian forces remain on Ukrainian territory, and I think President Zelensky has. And absolutely right at pointing out to various audiences that any agreement that Putin signs he doesn't live up to there were agreements in 2014 and 2015 called the Minsk accords, that were supposed to have led to ceasefires back when Russia first invaded Ukraine. Russia didn't live up to those agreements. It didn't live up to the cease fire agreement president, then President Sarkozy signed in 2008 after Russia invaded Georgia, it hasn't agreed to various other agreements, including the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 where Russia was supposed to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 1997 friendship. Agreement, I could go on and on, Putin's signature doesn't mean a damn thing. And so I think Zelensky is right to seek security guarantees so that Putin might at least be deterred that way, even if he doesn't abide by agreements he might sign. I

Arman Mahmoudian: 10:57

very much appreciate you of mentioning the Russia's previous violation of the commitments to Ukrainian territorial integrity. And that's why I want to kind of make a pivot to our first question again. So the matter of the security guarantee, it seems so far, and I would love to know here your insight on it, the United States administration is not interested in giving a deliberate and a clear cut security guarantee at this level, at least Ukrainian. But the question is that, should the United States decide to not make such a commitment on a legal basis? What would be the other options in which United States and European partner can make or imply somewhat of a security guarantee for the Ukraine, without offering Ukraine's NATO membership or signing any accord or treaty that offers a security guarantee?

David Kramer: 11:49

Sure, let me, let me answer that, but let me just add one other point to your earlier question Iran, and that is, it has been extraordinary to see Ukraine's innovation and development of its own military capabilities. Ukraine now is largely self reliant on development of drone technology, and it is, it is developed drones that can reach far into Russian territory, drones that carry significant weapon capacity and payload. So also huge credit to the Ukrainians, and they think that, based on that, they might be able to continue this, should us support come to an end on the question of security guarantees. Look, I think it was a mistake for the new US administration to rule out NATO membership. It didn't have to rule in NATO membership, if you will, but to rule it out, was essentially making a concession to the Russian side. Before negotiations even began, we have seen interesting comments from various leaders, including the prime minister of Italy, of all people, who has talked about some sort of Article Five guarantee, even if Ukraine were not a member of NATO, I think among Europeans, there is a recognition that Ukraine needs some sort of security guarantee, whether it is in the form of a deployment of European troops to provide some reassurance or deterrence against Russian invasion or some other way, the Ukrainians, I think not only need but deserve that kind of support. The Biden administration was clear it was not going to send us troops to engage in this fight. The Trump administration has continued that approach in policy, but I think we should be more open to the idea of providing some sort of security guarantees. I think it was a mistake to close the door on NATO to Ukraine. Keep that open is an issue to discuss, because, frankly, otherwise, we are granting Russia a de facto veto over Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO, and NATO has an open door policy, and no outside country should be able to reject that country's interest in joining the alliance. The Alliance is the most successful military defensive alliance in history. Countries that border Russia, such as Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania, now new entrance Finland, Norway, of course, has a small border up in the north Poland does with Kaliningrad. The reason those countries sleep better at night is because of Article Five security guarantees that come with NATO membership. And so I think it is important to be innovative and coming up with ideas that help provide some sense of security guarantees for the Ukrainians so that Putin doesn't do this again. Look The only, the only way Putin backs off is if he gets a punch in the nose, if his forces suffer defeats, and Russian forces have suffered terribly as a result of Putin's stupid decision to launch a full scale invasion. The estimates now are more than now. 900,000 Russian troops have been killed and wounded in this conflict. You've had North Korea send forces there. A lot of them have been wiped out. And so without North Korean or Iranian or Chinese support, I think Russia would be in a much worse position than it is right now. Without European and American support for Ukraine, Ukraine would be in a worse position. It seems to me, we have an obligation to do what we can to put Ukraine in the strongest position possible, whether to win this war, or to be in a strong position from which to negotiate.

Arman Mahmoudian: 15:34

Thank you. I must say, the argument you made about the NATO open door policy is quite fascinating, because the mostly focus that we do, we shouldn't offer Ukraine NATO membership because of the security concerns, and it's not the investors fight. But I barely heard that. Somebody makes an argument that if we don't do so, we actually giving Russia a veto right over the sovereignty of the NATO as an organization, I appreciate that, and I want to a little bit go back earlier to your you know comments about the Ukrainian military defense capability. We have seen Ukrainians rapid growth in production of drones, as you mentioned, also production of military material, being at the shells and others. And also covert operations. Ukrainian have gained a great a notable level of food footprint, COVID was in terms of sabotage, high value targeting in air Russia, and it's quite impressive. Why we have these on one hand, on the other hand is the matter of the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from the Kursk, which it's left many questions that why it happened so quickly. I mean, they were there for about a year. They had a good Advancement at the beginning of the offense, or counter offense, depends on the point they had resistance. Russians counter attacks quite well for a good number of the months and days. And then we have a sudden withdraw. And there is a debate out there, some making a suggestion that the withdrawal or retreat happen as a part of a political deal, preparing the stage for the treaty or ceasefire. I don't know about it. I personally don't see it quite likely, some pointing out that it was the outcome of withdrawal of US intelligence support, specifically speaking, sharing the satellite images, which, it seems the United States also pressed the European allies do not do so. As an expert, you're so you're a sovietologist and expert of Russia. I wonder, what do you think was behind the Kursk retreat so unexpectedly and quickly?

David Kramer: 17:38

Yeah, well, first I it was a risky move on the part of the Ukrainians that I think did pay off for several months. It was a morale boost for the Ukrainians at a time when they needed that morale boost. Remember, they were still recovering from the delay in approval of us funding and support. There were about six months or so between the time and 2023 until April of 24 when the US Congress finally approved the latest assistance package. And morale among the Ukrainians had been dropping, in part because of that. It was a bold move on the part of President zelenskyy and his military leadership, and it was a move that I think paid off. It was a morale boost. The main reason, I would argue, Arman is, yes, the suspension of military assistance and intel sharing from the United States brief, though it was, did have a negative impact on Ukraine's abilities. But the main difference, I would argue, is President Zelensky is a democratically elected leader of Ukraine. He actually has to care about what happens to his troops. He does have to make decisions if his troops are surrounded and encircled by the enemy, to try to minimize as much as possible the casualties that his forces would suffer. Contrast that with Putin, who doesn't care what happens to his his men that he sends into this battle or nor does North Korea's leader camp when he sends his forces to join Russia, they view their soldiers as cannon fodder. They view the North Koreans as simply, if you will, taking bullets, so the Ukrainians use up their bullets on North Koreans, and so that the Russians can then move in. And so I think that actually is the main reason there was fear that the Ukrainian forces in Kursk were going to be badly defeated and suffer huge casualties. And President Zelensky is a democratically elected leader of Ukraine. Had to take that into account. Putin has, I don't know if it's a luxury or just a total lack of concern for what happens to his people. And this is the difference between a brutal authoritarian, if not. Even fascist leader like Putin is and a democratically elected leader like Zelensky, and it is richly ironic I think that Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and others are talking about Ukraine's government being illegitimate because it has over stayed its term in office. Elections should have taken place last year for Ukraine, but under Ukrainian law, elections cannot be held because of martial law. Why was martial law imposed in Ukraine? Because Putin invaded Ukraine, and so for a leader who decides elections before they take place, who kills his opposition or imprisons them. Putin is, is has real chutzpah, in my view, to be talking about the Ukrainian leadership being illegitimate. That, to me, is the main reason for the withdrawal, as it has happened from course, Putin doesn't care about his guys. Zelensky does before

Arman Mahmoudian: 21:01

going forward. Quick question, you mentioned a political consideration. But can we say that the withdrawal from the Kors is somewhat an equivalent of the allied forces withdrawal from the Don cork in earlier stage of The World War Two? Little

David Kramer: 21:15

bit. I mean, yes. I mean the move into Kursk was, I think, to set up Ukraine to be in a stronger position for negotiations. We will withdraw from Kursk if the Russian forces would withdraw from from parts of occupied Ukraine. So I think you could make that comparison, but I think it was for purposes of morale. It was for the element of surprise. It was to try to draw Russian forces from parts of occupied Ukraine to the Kursk Region, but it also meant that Zelensky and his military leadership were pulling out some of its good forces from various parts of the front lines. There have been indications that the Ukrainians have been launching some incursions into the Belgorod region in Russia, and so the Ukrainians keep look. I think one thing that there, well, a couple things to draw our lessons from already, from this, from this situation, is never underestimate the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have proven to be an incredibly courageous, resilient people. There were most predictions when Putin was about to launch a full scale invasion in 2022 were that this war would be over in days. That was certainly the thinking in the Kremlin, but it was even the thinking in the US intelligence community and the Ukrainians have proven that to be terribly wrong. One other conclusion is, don't overestimate the Russians military capabilities, because the Russians have proven to be a pretty weak military. The Ukrainians have inflicted tremendous damage on the Russian military, taken out 1000s of tanks and various military vehicles and weapons systems, to say nothing of the 900,000 or so casualties on the Russian side, and we have provided less than 3% of our Pentagon budget in support of Ukraine. That seems to me to be one hell of a return on investment, the assistance we have provided Ukraine with the damage it has inflicted on Russian forces. And by the way, for us audiences, most of the money that we have provided stays in the United States. It goes to American workers and manufacturers of new weapon systems as we send older systems to the Ukrainians. And so this has been, I think, a very important investment, not only in Ukraine and the assistance it needs, but in the opportunity to update and develop our weapons and make sure we have enough, whether it's for helping Ukraine or any other contingencies. Thank

Arman Mahmoudian: 23:56

you. I very much appreciate that actually, all of your comment, what about what you said, that the money I spend is actually internally, remains internal in United States, I believe Senator Lindsey Graham also kind of delivered the speech on that. They made it very clean and plain and a very direct point I want to move forward with under the assumption that there will be a ceasefire and war is about reaching its conclusion, and I want to kind of divide it in three, stage one stages about Russia, what what future holds for Russia? What future holds for Ukraine and NATO. And I would like to start with the NATO, what would you see the state and circumstances, security wise for the NATO in a post ceasefire era, because the Ukraine development, the Ukraine war, from a pragmatic point of view, had benefits for NATO. NATO has been enlarged. Sweden and Finland are the part. We have seen a kind of revival of voice of collaboration in NATO, which. After the war on terror has kind of been on decline. I mean, in a very passive manner, the cooperation with tied it kind of awakened European desire to have a self sufficient and resilient military capability. Germany just passed the law last week. What would you think? What would the future for the NATO in a post Russo Ukrainian war, at least this stage of the world a second right?

David Kramer: 25:23

I agree that I think NATO has found its purpose. After floundering a little bit and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact, there certainly was a purpose in bringing in new members, and and one point I think worth making is that was driven by countries that were outside of NATO who had an incredibly strong desire and interest in joining NATO. It was not the case where the United States and other NATO Allies were trying to drag countries that didn't want to join the Alliance into the Alliance. This was in response initially to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who wanted to join the Alliance. And then it moved into the three Baltic States and other countries as well. And so the alliance has certainly increased significantly, largely because a lot of those countries have had experience with either Soviet aggression or Russian aggression, and wanted protection from them. But also joining NATO was a sense of returning a belonging to Europe. And I think that identity, together with the European Union, was very important to many countries. I think since 2022 we have seen NATO really move in a positive direction. We've seen a number of countries increase their defense spending, as they had promised they would do, and some of that is due to the pressure from President Trump during his first administration. And I think we see NATO in a stronger position today than we did before. But, and this is the important caveat, it will depend on the United States remaining a reliable member of the alliance right now. As you know, there is controversy with a fellow NATO member, Denmark, over the territory of Greenland. There are questions about whether the United States would respond if there were an attack on a country that doesn't spend more than 2% of its GDP on defense. There are questions about whether the United States would respond to a country that does spend more than 2% but is small and along Russia's borders, for example, one of the Baltic states. So I think the future of NATO is now going to depend on these questions that surround the United States as much as anything. But I do think that NATO has found its purpose in supporting Ukraine. And as you rightly point out, since the full scale invasion in 2022 the alliance has expanded. Finland and Sweden decided that Russian invasion of Ukraine was the tipping point for two countries that had stayed out of the Alliance for decades, and now we have 32 members, and now about 24 if not 25 of those countries do spend more than 22% of their GDP on defense, and the countries that don't need to pick up because the United because of the questions about the United States and the uncertainty about how reliable the US will be.

Arman Mahmoudian: 28:31

Q, I want to sum up it wouldn't be Russia's opposition to NATO that determines the future of NATO. It would be the American factor, and where does the United States stands?

David Kramer: 28:42

I think that's right. Yes. I mean, unless we give Russia a de facto veto over other countries aspirations to join. But I think right now, one of the biggest questions facing the alliance is what the United States will do. President Trump has been rather critical of NATO allies for various reasons, we have seen some disparagement of European leaders talking about sending a force to Ukraine to help provide assistance there and security for Ukraine. As I said earlier, NATO is the most successful military alliance in history, and the United States has been central to it. It is one of the founding members of NATO going back to 1949 and so I don't think NATO's job is finished. I think the job of NATO remains important. And what we also need to recognize is countries that are in the gray zone, which is to say countries that are no longer part of the Warsaw Pact or part of the Soviet Union, but are also no longer, or not no longer, but are also not members of NATO. We need to help address that issue about the gray zone, because countries in the gray zone are the ones most vulnerable to Russian aggression, and it's no coin. Incidents that it's Georgia that has been invaded by Russia. Ukraine has been invaded by Russia. Moldova that has an occupying force in the Transnistrian region of Russian troops. Those three countries are not members of NATO, but Russia has not attacked a NATO member state, at least in a full kinetic way. There was a cyber attack against Estonia in 2007 and so it is. It is, I think, is dependent on what the United States does is as it is on Russia. What we let Russia do,

Arman Mahmoudian: 30:32

perfect. Thank you. Speaking of Russia now again, so I want to ask about the Russia's imposed War era we have seen, and it's been stated by you. It's been stated by other former officials and experts, including our Executive Director General Matt can see that one of the things that we realized about the Ukraine from the Ukraine war is that we had, we didn't have the accurate assessment of the Russians military capability. However, during the time of the war. While the Russians had setbacks, we have witnessed also a growth in a specific sectors of the Russia's military. It seems they're jamming, and their electronic warfare has kind of catching out. It seems that they are in it. They are developing. It seems that they are reviving their military cooperations with the outsiders, which was kind of it was on and off prior so that with the Iranians, with the North Koreans, some SIP reports, also soldiers from the Chinese, but it seems they are less bold than Iranian Koreans, North Koreans. So one question would be, what would be the Russia's projection of power look like in the post war era and what would be the direction of Russia's foreign policy? Because there, there is a growing concern, not only in West, actually neighboring countries. Of Russia's reports, comes a good chunk of the good number of people in Belarus and Gaza. Some both have neighboring and also substantial Russians minorities, or Belarus is Slavic country, are concerned about their future as a sovereign state. How would Russia look like a day a year after the peace fire with Ukraine?

David Kramer: 32:15

You know what they say about predictions? They're awfully hard to make about the future. I think it depends on how the war that Russia started against Ukraine ends. If it ends in a fragile ceasefire, then I don't think Russia will have learned its lesson. If it ends in a way that Ukraine is seen as as rather victorious in the sense of regaining control over its territory over time, whether militarily or diplomatically, that I think, will have an impact on the future of Russia. You're right to bring up Belarus in a way Russia has occupied. Belarus Lukashenko is so the long time leader of Belarus has been in power since 1994 is incredibly dependent on Putin and Russia for staying in power. He stole the election in his country in August of 2020. Launched a brutal crackdown weaponized immigrants and refugees along the borders with Lithuania and Poland, and then then basically hijacked a Ryanair flight that was going from Greece to Lithuania. Luke Sheng remains a threat, and we shouldn't fall for his efforts to try to play Russian in the West off of each other. I cite that because it is another example of how Russia uses other authoritarian leaders to advance its cause, and Lukashenko is complicit in the Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 because he allowed the territory of Belarus to be used as a launching pad For part of that invasion, particularly heading to a Kyiv, the capital, I think Moldova remains fragile, given the occupying force in the Transnistrian part of that country and Russia is doing everything it can to try to pull Moldova back into Its sphere. Georgia is a very unfortunate situation where you have essentially a pro Russian party, Georgian dream that is doing Russia's dirty work for it, and an oligarch bin Zina Ibn ashvili, who runs the country essentially, who made his fortune in Russia, that looks at Russia is George's partner, not the West in the United States. But then you also see Armenia, where the Armenians feel betrayed by the Russians, that Russia didn't come to Armenia's aid in its time of need when Azerbaijan moved into Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan has always had a complicated relationship with with Russia, so the dynamics there, I think, are not favorable to Russia's expanding influence, but Russia has never done it in a soft way. It does it through hybrid tactics. It does it through brute use of force, and so it's really important, I think, for the United States and our European allies to stand with those countries, to press for democratic progress in these countries, but also to make sure that their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected. I think the future of Russia will be up to the Russian people. So speaking domestically now about Russia, I think there is too much concern in Washington and in other places about who might come next after Putin. We're not going to have a say in that. That's going to be up to the Russian people in one form or another. And so I think we should not tie our hands behind our backs and not help Ukraine out of some fear that what might come after Putin might be worse. Looking at what Putin has been doing, it's pretty bad. Invaded Georgia, invaded Ukraine twice. The pressure, the basic takeover of Belarus, the pressure on Moldova, the hybrid activity in Europe and even in the United States. The Putin regime is a danger, not only to its own people, but to its neighbors and to the United States. And I think full recognition of that is critically important when we hear some US officials say Putin is not a bad guy, well, look at his record. If he's not a bad guy, I'm not quite sure what a bad guy would look like and so and we shouldn't fall for his traps and trying to play games and and win us over with some silly measures. Putin means us harm. He doesn't. He also means harm to his neighbors. He wants to make sure that Ukraine is not a successful democratic country moving closer to the west, because he worries that could pose a threatening alternative to the authoritarian grip he has in his own country and India, he doesn't recognize Ukraine as an independent state. He said that to President Bush as far back as 2008 and he has repeated that line many, many times. So we need to recognize that Russia under Putin remains a threat. Russia after Putin may remain a threat. There's no guarantee that Russia will be better, but we shouldn't. We shouldn't tie our hands behind our back out of fear that Russia after Putin may be worse. It may be better, I don't know, but it also isn't going to be determined by Washington, Brussels, or anybody else who will be determined by the people of Russia. Thank you, and

Arman Mahmoudian: 38:01

we go through the last stage of this question, and the question before the concluding question, I want to ask you about the future of Ukraine, and I need to kind of give a foreign fair warning to you and the audience that I'm guilty of obsession with the History and when I look at the conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 and 2022 what comes to my mind is the way that the Nazi Germany went after the Czechoslovakia, a salami slicing, piece by piece, which evidently led to the destruction of the Czechoslovakia, of you know, sort of A sovereign state, as they've been occupied by Germany? What future would hold for Ukraine in the post the day after, or years after the cease war with Russia? How can they can they survive, protect their survival and territorial integrity and sovereign state without being a member of the NATO? Look,

David Kramer: 39:01

I think you're right to bring up history. And I think the comparison to 1938 with Czechoslovakia is an apt one. If you think back to 2014 the first Minsk agreement that was signed in September of 2014 so March of 2014 is when Russia illegally annexed Crimea. September 2014 was the first Minsk agreement, and then early in 2015 was the second. Neither Minsk agreement mentioned Crimea, and so those efforts to bring about a ceasefire didn't deal with one of the key parts of the conflict back then, which was Russian occupation of Crimea and the use of Crimea as a launching pad for attacks against other parts of Ukraine. As long as Russian forces are on Ukrainian territory, whether it's done yet, Zaporizhzhia, her son, you name it, or Crimea, Russia will remain a threat to Ukraine. And so I think it is crucial. Critically important that we never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo essentially issued a declaration on this in the first Trump administration. And we shouldn't think that there were legitimate referenda in these other four regions where Ukrainians living in those occupied territories wanted to join Russia. It's utter nonsense. The referenda, as they were called, were conducted under gunpoint. I think there are very few Ukrainians who have given a choice would want to join Russia, given the way Russia has treated the populations in these regions that it has occupied, it's been brutal, and if you look at what they've done in other parts of Ukraine, Bucha and Mariupol and other places, the Russians deliberately try to inflict fear and tremendous destruction on Ukraine. Why? Because Putin doesn't recognize Ukraine as an independent state, and as long as that is the case, he will pose a threat to Ukraine. And so that's why I think it is important, whether again, militarily or diplomatically, that we support efforts to restore Ukraine's full sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that includes Crimea. Crimea is a part of Ukraine that Russia recognized in the Bela vija agreements in 1991 through various treaties and agreements with Ukraine, the Budapest Memorandum of 94 the friendship treaty between Russia and Ukraine and 97 again, on and on. There are many times where Russia has recognized Ukraine that includes Crimea, and so I do think that we set ourselves up for the potential of renewal of aggression from Russia if we don't support restoration of the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and those salami tactics that you referred to would Be very much on the Russian menu for Ukraine.

Arman Mahmoudian: 42:03

Thank you. I appreciate it. You've been very kind and generous with giving us very insightful answers, and I'm going to take advantage of your kindness with the one last question,

David Kramer: 42:12

one that's your listeners might think my answers have been too long, that's why. Not so long, but I appreciate it.

Arman Mahmoudian: 42:20

No, I'm quite confident they would enjoy, Mr. Kramer, you're a veteran, a scholar, and also a civil servant of the foreign policy you've been the State Department for a while, for a couple of years. If the US administration asks you right now, what should be the immediate action they are going to take regarding the war in Ukraine and the restoration of the order. That is the first thing that needs to be done right now

David Kramer: 42:47

to increase military assistance and intelligence sharing for Ukraine. Ukraine needs our support. We talked earlier. Ukraine will keep fighting, even if we end that support, but making sure we continue that, I think is the first thing that we need to do. But then, if you'll allow me, I'll add a couple other things, tighten the sanctions on Russia. Don't talk about lifting the sanctions. Don't allow Russia back into the Swift banking system. As long as Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory and carry out aggression against Ukraine, let's remember that Putin has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for the abduction of Ukrainian children into Russia, and So Russia has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity and genocide against the Ukrainian people for that kind of regime. We should not be talking about easing of sanctions right now, I would have recommended, but I think this one may be a pipe dream of keeping the door open to NATO. That doesn't seem very likely, I recognize in the current circumstances, but there's one other I'll just mention, and that is, there is an opportunity to make Russia pay for what it has done, and that is to move from not just freezing but seizing the $300 billion that Putin and Russian officials stupidly left in western financial institutions at the start of the full scale invasion of February 2022 that Money, in my view, should never be returned to Russia after the terrible destruction of damage it has caused in Ukraine. The Russians, more than anyone, should be forced to pay for what they have done before assistance for reparations and and rebuilding company United States or from Europe. The Russians should be the first ones in line, and that $300 billion has been sitting in our banks for years. We're using the interest to securitize loans for Ukraine from that that's not enough, and to me, it would be unconscionable to allow that money to go back to Ukraine. That's a way to pay make Russia pay for the damage it has done. So. So military assistance and intelligence sharing for Ukraine, tightening sanctions, seizing those funds that Russia left, and ideally not totally closing the door on NATO for Ukraine down the road. Thank

Arman Mahmoudian: 45:15

you. I'm sure those of our audience who are in the decision making process would enjoy our users enjoy that this evening. But thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Kramer from the Bush Institute, it was very kind of you to be in our program. We appreciate it opportunity, and thanks for all of your insight. Thank you. Thanks so

David Kramer: 45:32

much for having me. I really appreciate great questions. Thank you. You

Jim Cardoso: 45:44

We hope you enjoyed a great conversation about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the largest land war in Europe since World War Two, and which has impacted millions of lives in the region, even as that conflict is now in its third year, still lots of threads to pull on and better understand. Thanks today to David Cramer, head of the George W Bush Institute, next week on at the boundary, we're going to talk with Dr Armand mahmudian, a research fellow here at GNSI. He recently conducted an interview on the Yemeni Houthis on this podcast, but we'll put him on the other end of the mic to talk about the upcoming research series he's putting together on the Axis of Resistance. This series will feature in depth examinations in the Middle East, focusing on Iran, as well as the roles of Russia and North Korea as those countries continue to expand their influence in the region. The series will be months in the making and will feature significant research and new discussion and analysis. We're looking forward to a preview with Arman next week. Don't miss it. Thanks for listening today. If you like the podcast, please share with your colleagues and network. You can follow GNSI on our LinkedIn and X accounts at USF, underscore GNSI, and check out our website as well at usf.edu/gnsi where you can also subscribe to our monthly newsletter that's going to wrap up this episode about the boundary. Each new episode will feature global and national security issues we've found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall, just worth talking about. I'm Jim Cardoso, and we'll see you at the boundary.