Did Syria Prepare Russia for Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine?

In this episode of At the Boundary, Tad Schnaufer, PhD, speaks with John Pennell, PhD, a Senior Diplomacy Fellow with Narrative-Strategies, Senior Strategic Advisor with Pax Strategies LLC, Senior Practitioner with the Irregular Warfare Center, and author of Assessing Russia's Actions in Ukraine and Syria, 2014–2022: Implications for the Changing Character of War

Pennell breaks down Russia’s military and political strategies in two key theaters, Ukraine and Syria, and the implications for NATO, the United States, and global security.

Their discussion covers:

• Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics in Ukraine prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion, including “Little Green Men,” the Wagner Group, and local proxy forces
• How Russia’s disinformation campaigns, strategic plausible deniability, and cyber warfare shaped operations in Crimea and Donbas
• The 2015 Syrian intervention was a testing ground for drones, electronic warfare, and emerging military technology
• The debate over terminology used to describe the conflict: hybrid warfare vs. new generation warfare vs. full-spectrum conflict, and why these distinctions matter in military strategy and geopolitics
• Lessons for NATO, the U.S., and allies from Russian military operations between 2014–2022
• The Kremlin’s shift from destabilizing Ukraine to pursuing regime change, and the information warfare narratives used to justify it
• Implications for future conflicts and how the U.S. and partners can counter hybrid threats effectively

Links from the Episode:

• Cyber Bay Registration Link 

• Read The Latest GNSI Newsletter

• 2025 Notes from Cambridge Blog

• Assessing Russia's Actions in Ukraine and Syria, 2014–2022: Implications for the Changing Character of War by Dr. John A. Pennell

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Transcript

Tad Schnaufer: 1:40

Hey, John, well, welcome to the podcast.

Dr. John Pennell: 2:00

Thank you. Thanks for having me excited to be here. So today we're

Tad Schnaufer: 2:03

going to be discussing, you know, the Russia's involvement in Ukraine, particularly before the full Russia's involvement in Ukraine, particularly 2015 timeframe so scale invasion, the tactics, the methods that they used in they used in Ukraine war, around 20. 2014 and 2022, as well as Ukraine between

Dr. John Pennell: 2:12

2014 and 2022 as well as their involvement in their involvement in Syria and particularly the Syrian civil Syria, and particularly the Syrian Civil War around 2015 war. Mention of military's response in return. And so timeframe. So why don't we start back chronologically with this discussion, John, and talk about what was going on and what interests you specifically with Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014 and then moving into Syria in 2015 certainly. Well again, thanks for having me. Big fan of the podcast and what GNSI is doing in the irregular warfare space, and also future war space as well. And I think this will be hopefully a useful contribution. So I was actually serving for the US government in Ukraine itself, from 2015 to 2019 and was very interested in all the discussions and debates, both in policy circles, but also scholarly circles about hybrid warfare and kind of Russia's actions in Ukraine, specifically with the so called Little Green Men, and, you know, forces in Crimea that were unmarked. And you know what this all meant. And there was a lot of back and forth and debate on whether Russia was inventing or start starting up a new form of warfare, and if so, what it was and what it looked like. And then shortly thereafter, they started intervening in Syria, which at that time, it was the first time that they'd really projected power outside of their traditional sphere of influence in Eurasia in quite some time. And so I think there was a lot of concern, rightly so, as to what was going on, what this all meant. Obviously, the West, the US NATO and others, our allies and partners have a lot of interest in the Mediterranean, let alone in Eastern Europe. And so that's kind of really what kicked it off for me. And I decided to pursue a PhD in at King's College London, and I was focusing specifically on Russia's interventions in Ukraine, and want to use something else, such as Syria as a kind of a comparator. And so that's kind of where Genesis, really of this book for me, again, which is based on my PhD thesis, kind of originated Excellent So, and going back to that timeframe, people might not remember the kind of complexity of what was going on all these actions below the threshold of war that were taking place in 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, as you mentioned, the little green men. These are the soldiers that didn't have patches on. They just kind of show up. So what do we call those tactics? And how did those evolve over 2014 and 20 Ukraine? Sure. So I think at that time, hybrid seemed to have been the most common term, although you could argue that irregular today, we use gray zone a lot more, but a range of different activities, tools that are essentially below the threshold, as you described, because the sole purpose, really of allowing for plausible deniability and ideally not certainly, I think that's kind of what took everyone by surprise, in that sense, at least those who maybe not necessarily were that familiar with Russian, even Soviet era tactics, often referred to as active measures, which, frankly, there's been a lot of consistency in Russia's approach, certainly prior to February of 2022

Tad Schnaufer: 5:24

and that's interesting part is that the even the concepts that were being used in 2014 were so obscure that you really don't have an acceptable definition of what it was. So hybrid warfare had a lot of scholarly baggage with it, even before 2014 because it was used with terrorist organizations and non state actors. So how did you conceptualize that in your book and then also in your research?

Dr. John Pennell: 5:48

Certainly, so part of the book is really focused on the array of different terms that are being used. You know, hybrid or regular, gray zone, full spectrum conflict, that new generation warfare, political warfare, there's a fair amount of overlap among the different terms. I think some of them more more relevant for a particular context, and not that we should necessarily throw any one of them away. And there are specific definitions, for example, that the Department of Defense, us, Department of Defense uses for some of these terms. And so what I was trying to get at with that was to try to get a better sense of how much of the focus on hybrid is hype versus like, is there a there, there, so to speak. And so I think it really was maybe an overplayed term, not that what Russia was doing was not significant. It certainly was. And I myself do use the term hybrid warfare, you know, regularly, but my preference of all the terms is probably more full spectrum conflict, or new generation warfare, full spectrum, because I think it better describes the array of tools that that the Russians have been using to this day, and then also new generation warfare, because that is a term that the Russians themselves have used to describe, along with the hybrid warfare concept, what it perceives as the US or the West doing against Russia, and historically doing against Russia. And so I think those are more probably relevant. But any one of these terms could be used depending on a particular context. And so part of the book does try to break down the where there's overlap, where there's distinction, and kind of what is made maybe more relevant than others, depending on the case, right,

Tad Schnaufer: 7:36

because a lot of influential factors of both sides the grass involved doctrine, which was a part of an article we published in 2013 General grassimoff, the Russian General, and then also the US definitions before the conflict started, absolutely. So with those you know, let's just take the term out of it. Then in 2014 Ukraine, what are the primary characteristics of the conflict, which, you know, whatever you call it. What were the Russians actually doing that was different. So certainly,

Dr. John Pennell: 8:04

again, kind of going back to then called fall of 2013 that the Euromaidan protests, where the then president of Ukraine, Yanukovych, that kind of backtracked on the population's desire to join the EU and started to make some dealings with Putin that led to a series of protests, and unfortunately, leading to a lot of violence against protesters, unarmed civilians, etc, which then kind of spurred worse protests, with which then eventually led to Yanukovych fleeing to Russia himself, along with a lot of money and other things. And after that, somewhat in response, of course, the Russians had already been working in eastern Ukraine and Donbas with different proxy forces, local militias, those who are like minded, so to speak, leveraging cultural affinity, religious affinity, ethnicity, language, et cetera, those who identified as Russian compatriots, for example, or were supportive of Russia. And I think one thing that's key to all of this is that, you know, Ukraine and Russia border each other, obviously, but they have had a shared history in some ways, for many, many years. And one of the things that Russia tried to do, at least initially, was to exploit where there were opportunities to leverage the affinity that some Ukrainians had toward Russia, and not only in the east, but also in southern Ukraine as well. And then, of course, in Crimea, where traditionally, the population in Crimea had identified more as ethnic Russian. And so I think because of those connections, it was a little bit easier for Russia to intervene in some of those areas and use proxy forces in eastern and southern Ukraine, and then, of course, going into Korea. Crimea with the so called unmarked soldiers or little green men, for the purpose, really, of plausible deniability. And one of the main things related to that, of course, is to make it seem like this is homegrown. And also that to the extent Russia needed to intervene, it was to protect ethnic Russians from the so called fascists in Kiev. And that, you know, the new government that was forming under President Petro Poroshenko at that time, the Kremlin narrative was that not only was he fascist, but he hated Russians and Russian language, etc, etc. And so, you know, that stirred up a lot of fear. It's obviously using a lot of disinformation. But also technologies. And that's something I'm happy to talk about in more depth, because that's been one kind of key thing over the evolution of, I think, Russian warfare in Ukraine and in Syria as well, the role of new technologies, military technologies, but also non military technologies, but that can have strategic effects or very broader strategic objective impacts. And I think that's also critical,

Tad Schnaufer: 11:11

sure, because we've seen Russian cyber attacks, you've seen misinformation campaigns. We've seen them handing out passports to people who want to be Russian, so being able to craft this deceptive narrative, and again, using technology in many ways over the span of the time we'll discuss here post 2014 so how did that change after that initial shock in early 2014

Dr. John Pennell: 11:33

certainly. So I think at that point, the West, the US, NATO, allies and partners, kind of, I think, quickly caught on that Russia was up to some pretty nefarious activities, and obviously Ukrainians did as well. I think still, what was somewhat offsetting, or maybe was the challenge initially, is that everything that Kremlin was doing at that time was really just below the threshold of a, I think, wildly accepted concept of what war is. And so I think the question is, okay, how would the US NATO allies and partners respond to that, short of actual violent conflict or confrontation that was more conventional? And so I think it took some time to catch up, because Russia was doing quite a lot of things, and not only using proxies in terms of local militias or the little green men or such, but also, again, the compatriots, those who had some affinity towards Russia for a variety of reasons, could be ethnic, could be religious, or It could be language linguistic issues, but also those who were either involved in the economy. Donbas, historically, was a very industrial part of the country of Ukraine, and you had a lot of what had been previously called oligarchs, I guess that term is still used today. And I would say the situation oligarchs in Ukraine has been cleaned up quite a bit over the years, over the past several years in particular. And so, you know, Zelensky, President of Ukraine, deserves some credit for that. But at that time, at least a lot of the oligarchs in Ukraine had earned their money and income from Moscow or connections to Russia. And so I think Moscow was also able to lever local businesses in Ukraine and their leadership in the so called oligarchs to also produce some impacts that would benefit them as well, and particularly engaging in the parliament in Kiev. But then you also had a number of so called Think tankers, experts, media personalities. Yet a lot of at that time, again, it's been cleaned up quite a bit, but a lot of media outlets that had either pro Russia backers, financiers or folks are doing commentary in the news. And so there was just a lot of room and opportunity for Russia to sow doubt amongst the Ukrainian population, let alone the global population, the world, if you will, as to what was happening in Ukraine. And so the Battle of the narrative really, really was kind of starting and getting stronger and stronger at that point. And that's something that you know continues to this day. Happy to talk more about that in a

Tad Schnaufer: 14:19

second, right? Because that battle, the narrative really spreads across again, like we started the internet, not only on the ground, but also through media networks. These Russian troll farms have constant comments on social media, so it's really hard to get the real facts from the ground, because there's so much deception going on out there. And these actors, as you mentioned, that are not actually the Russian government directly, they're a proxy that being used to the Russian government and one of those other groups that came on to prominence Not long into the Ukraine conflict, and later, famously in Syria, than the than the actual full scale invasion would be those military contractors, private military contractors like Wagner group. So how did those come about and but. Dissipation campaign,

Dr. John Pennell: 15:02

certainly, yeah, so the private military contractors, Wagner, I guess, is the most notorious, but there were several others. Certainly, it was another effort or way, or tool, if you will, in terms of plausible deniability. And what was interesting as well is that a lot of these private military contractors of PMCS actually flowed back and forth between both the Syria area of operation, also Ukraine area of operation, and so as part of that, also taking lessons learned from one theater to another and all to again, kind of advance. You know Russia's narrative that, well, we're actually not there were actually not on the ground in Ukraine, at least that this is all homegrown. This is folks who are dissatisfied with the new government in Ukraine that is taking the country away from its historical partner, Russia, if you will. I think what's also important to note that the PMCs, you know, in Syria in particular, were used for a variety of activities, and just to compare kind of the different approaches, and then different areas of focus and objectives between the two theaters. You know, in Syria, it really was about, you know, propping up the Assad regime, keeping him in power, but under the we could say, maybe false pretense of fighting ISIS, fighting terrorists, something that obviously the US, the West, NATO and others, are also very concerned about, and the instability that not dealing with that issue could bring to the Middle East. And we've seen, obviously, a lot of challenges in the Middle East over the years with terrorism, from, you know, whether it was Al Qaeda or Daesh ISIS, et cetera. And so kind of using that as a narrative as to why it was intervening in Syria, but but also to, you know, help keep Assad in power and then ensure that it had access to its naval and air bases there as well. So the PMCs, the Wagner and other groups, particularly in Syria, did an array of things, including like direct action, going after so called terrorists, helping and working with Iranian backed militias, let alone Syrian regime military, to also fight, you know, so called terrorists, and then also to secure different energy related installations, and then which also led to business opportunities, if you will, among the different private military contractor firms. You know, later on, that was kind of one of the longer term impacts there, and then similarly intervening as proxies in Ukraine as well, alongside local militias in Ukraine, and then installing as well, pro Moscow backed leadership in like Donetsk and Luhansk, and then other parts of eastern and southern Ukraine as well. And so those actors have played a very significant role in both the areas of operation.

Tad Schnaufer: 18:12

Yeah. It reminds me at the time, you know, the early time, 20 14/25, 2016 that when Ukrainians caught actual Russian soldiers in Ukraine in the Donbas conflict, the Russians would just say they were on holiday or on leave, and they chose to volunteer to go fight there. And again, all about that deniability of actually being on the ground, right? So as we we look at that deniability campaign, that the ability to conduct operations but not be held responsible for the outcomes. How did that translate from Ukraine in 2014 and then when the Russians first will go into Syria actively? Obviously, they had the base there prior, but they actually actively start conducting military operations in 2015

Dr. John Pennell: 18:52

Yeah. So what was quite interesting, I think, and want to talk about this a little bit more in depth as well, if you look back at Russian doctrine, the military doctrine, but also its foreign policy concepts, its national security strategies, its information security strategies, over the years, if not decades, there's been a consistent theme, particularly since I'd say, the late 90s, after the NATO intervention in the Balkans and Serbia In particular, but then also a little bit earlier, in terms of the first Gulf War in the early 90s, some themes around that the West NATO, led by the US, et cetera, is trying to encircle Russia, and doing a variety of activities that create instability in Russia's historic, if you will, sphere of influence. And so that kind of also goes back to Russia's strategic culture, historically, this fear of being invaded, this fear of just being insecure. And there has been a history of invasion, of course, over the years in Russia by a number of different actors from the west. And so thinking about. About these actions by its obviously adversaries and Russia's perspective, whereas the US or the West may think about intervening in Iraq in the early 90s to help Kuwait or help Kosovars in Serbia in the late 90s, Russia perceives this as, you know, going too far and kind of intervening in its sphere of influence. So that really, really drives the Russian thinking, official thinking, and it's certainly been written about again, going back years, if not decades. And so kind of what this means in terms of Syria and Ukraine, specifically, particularly during the 2014 to 22 timeframe, is looking at in the Syria context, you know what happened with the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia's perception, the instability and chaos that that kind of led to, and this perception, I think arguably so, there was A lot of instability and chaos in Iraq, let alone the Middle East. After that, that when it was intervening in Syria, its long standing ally in Syria, it did not want the same fate to happen to Assad as what happened to Saddam Hussein, and so that was one of his driving factors, you know, also the concern about terrorism coming back home to Russia itself. And so, you know, you could argue there's legitimate concern on Russia's part to have some intervention. And like I said, USF is an ally. And then Russia has also had air and naval bases there too. So also interested in kind of, you know, protecting those as well. So I think that's kind of the driver for the Syria intervention, which was more overt or conventional that we saw in the initial stages, at least, of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, at least at the February 2022, and having said that, you know, Syria really was also used as kind of a live fire testing ground for Russia, and it involves a lot of air power, involved a lot of new technologies, you know, the drones, et cetera, electronic warfare, a whole lot of other new military equipment testing, if you will, and then also opportunities for its Military officers to be trained again like a live fire setting, and so using that then as a basis to adapt to what it was also doing in Ukraine. So taking possibly arguably legitimate reasons to help us sit out in Syria, but then taking that approach and adapting and learning in Ukraine as well. So that, I think that that's important to note when you think about the two contexts, particularly at that point in time. I think the other really important point about Syria, after seeing how the US and the West got bogged down in Iraq for so many years that it tried to avoid a similar conclusion, if you will. And so what Gerasimov and others refer to as the strategy of limited means, or limited aims that really just wanted to go in, rely on local forces, rely on PMCs, Special Forces, as well as needed air power, bombing campaigns, etc, etc, to really get in and out. And so they more or less wrapped up their operation with within like a year or so timeframe. Obviously, they have continued involvement with Syria. I think it still remains to be seen with the new leadership in Syria, kind of what that means for the Russian presence, regarding its naval and air bases. But I think that's important to note. And then obviously in Ukraine, there's still an ongoing war right now, and it's become more and more conventional since February 2022 situation, Ukraine's kind of shifted, shifted a lot since that

Tad Schnaufer: 24:02

point, right? And, you know, looking before that large scale invasion of Ukraine in 22 how had Russian operations, you know, as you just mentioned, in Syria and Ukraine, how did they evolve in that timeframe from 2014 to 2022 before everything kind of changes the game with that large scale invasion,

Dr. John Pennell: 24:20

certainly. Well, I think, you know, the one consistent thing that I've seen, you know, when I was working in Ukraine myself, let alone, you know, the research that I was able to conduct is taking advantage of a couple of different things, one being the geographic proximity, some of the connections to populations in Eastern, southern Ukraine in particular, although inadvertently, I'm sure this wasn't their intention. The idea of being Ukraine, or a whole Ukraine, has certainly gotten much stronger over the years, and certainly even the time frame that I was there. So inadvertently, I think, as those who may have initially. Maybe believe some of the disinformation coming from Moscow. I think a number have changed the perspective over the years. And then certainly, I think since 2022 that Ukrainians are generally much, much more united than maybe they've ever been. And so that's kind of one, I think, outcome that Russia, certainly, I imagine, did not, would not intend to have done. But the other really important point is technology, and technology continues to develop rapidly, continues to be used for kinetic purposes, but also non kinetic purposes that can still have strategic impacts. And so the use of, you know, in more and more AI in terms of military technologies, you know, unmanned systems, drones, electronic warfare, precision guided munitions, all of these types of things are other tools that not only enable greater plausible deniability, although, again, since February 22 that that's less relevant, but also enable actors including Russia, but also Ukraine. Because Ukraine's made a lot of advances in technology. It's quite innovative as well, but it allows the battlefield to happen in situations where even there are, even though there are a lot of casualties, that it could potentially reduce the number of, you know, direct, kind of conventional, you know, tank on tank, or soldier on soldier, kind of on the on the ground, if you will, combat. Obviously, that still does happen, but with all the emerging technology, I think it's really important to note that that's kind of been a major shift over the years, and something that really I think the US allies and partners need to continue to watch and try to learn and adapt from but then also expect that our competitors and adversaries are also watching what's happening as well and also learning and adapting as well. And so I think just going back to the initial question and discussion about terminology, that's why I really believe that, particularly with the rise of these new technologies and how quickly they are enabling things to happen in real time and more and more remotely, that it's really going to have an impact on how war is conducted going forward. And so I just think we as Americans need to be prepared to understand that better and think about it more and continue to socialize with their own populations as to what this could look like cyber attacks, you know, and many other things as well,

Tad Schnaufer: 27:34

right? Because, even though you know, as you mentioned, you know, you get the large scale invasion of Russia, or from Russia to Ukraine in 2022 right? And that changes the conflict of prime conflict to primarily conventional, but you still see those other hybrid methods, or whatever you'd like to call them, happening during the conventional conflict. So is that the change that we're we're seeing that a conventional conference going to have a lot more of these, you know, cyber attacks or information campaigns. Is that what we're looking at?

Dr. John Pennell: 27:59

That's what I think, and that's certainly what I've seen, you know, studying at least Ukraine and Syria. But I think you can argue elsewhere from other actors and non state actors as well, smartphones, that is obviously an easier way to enable us to stay connected and communicate with one another, but it's also another tool that can be used for malign or nefarious purposes, hacking into personnel files of US government employees conducting cyber attacks against energy or telecommunications infrastructure, doing deep fakes on different social media apps. I mean, all of these things are not only can be used for criminal activities, but can also be used for more strategic activities as well. And so I do think, and I do see that that's likely that this technology, in an array of domains, if you will, is likely to play an even bigger role and future conflict. And

Tad Schnaufer: 29:00

like you said, with, you know, drones, not just air drones. Most people think drones. You think a quad copter or something like that. Maybe a Predator drone from the war, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but now you have land and sea drones that are conducting a lot of operations. And even just recently, a Russian unit surrendered to a bunch of rolling land drones has made the news, you know, the first time you've seen a render of that sort. So is that also going to continue? You think you continue to evolve the battlefield as we look at possible future conflicts, I

Dr. John Pennell: 29:29

do, and I think that's also very concerning, because I think increasingly non combatant local populations are going to be more and more participants in the battlefield or in the battle space, if you will, either knowingly or unknowingly. And some have said that we're already in a war by other means, and unfortunately, many don't know about it. And so yes, I do see that continuing. That does not mean I think. That conventional forces or conventional tactics would go away, I just think that they would be significantly augmented by these new technologies on the battlefield, and just the fact that, again, the world is so globally interconnected that I think much easier to pursue a state or non state actor to pursue its objectives without necessarily having to be in front of someone or nearby at all. And so definitely, I think, things to be aware of and keep thinking and focusing

Tad Schnaufer: 30:34

on, right. So what has the US, Western powers, observers in general, learned from Russia's operations in Ukraine and Syria.

Dr. John Pennell: 30:44

So I think couple of different things. You know, first, as I mentioned, going back to Russia's intervention 2015, to 16 in Syria, that Russia was able to project power outside its traditional sphere of influence. So indicating that it had the potential to do that. I think currently it's very much overstretched, I think obviously in Ukraine, but it showed that, at least at that time, it conduct operations in two different theaters, because it was also operating in Ukraine as well. And so showing that capability, I think it also showed in Syria that was able to operate with a diverse array of forces under kind of like an integrated command structure as well. It's something that obviously the US and, you know, NATO and allies and partners, in terms of the concept of joint operations, if you will, has done a lot of and continues to do I also think going back prior to Syria and Ukraine in 2008 I think Russia also learned a lot from its war in Georgia and realized a lot of the failings that it had. Obviously continues to occupy 20% Georgian territory to this day, but, you know, I think Russia certainly did not perform as well in Georgia in 2008 as it thought it would. And I think learned a lot of lessons, and so underwent a lot of military modernization transformation over the years, which I think aided it in its performance in Syria and certainly in initial parts of Ukraine as well. And then also just looking more at the integration of unmanned systems, precision strike systems of special forces on the ground. I think that's also what's really important for its work in Syria. And then, of course, electronic warfare, and many other things related to that in the cyber space as well. But then also back to the issue of like narrative framing and kind of information space and shaping public perceptions, you know, arguing that, yes, Assad is our long standing ally and partner, but there's also problems with instability stemming from terrorist threats in the country, in the region, and that we need to support them, and that actually fighting against the terrorist benefits the US and its allies and partners as well. And so I think, you know, there was some debate or discussion about to the extent that the Kremlin was being fully honest, transparent about that. But then also, you know, the concept in Ukraine initiative at least, about protecting ethnic Russians and kind of Russian culture and heritage from what it was describing to its population and Ukraine and others as a very anti Russia Russian government in the time, at that time in Ukraine, but then beyond that, particularly in Ukraine, I think just the fact that Russia had longstanding economic and other connections to business people, the so called oligarchs, to media outlets, to political parties and politicians, etc, etc, that it was much easier to pursue its objectives without necessarily relying on conventional forces or even proxy forces. It obviously did use those forces as well, but some of that, I don't think, could be replicated in other theaters as easily as it could in Ukraine, just given all the avenues for Russian influence in Ukraine at that time, obviously, that's changed a lot and evolved over the years. Certainly I don't think that's the case since 2022 but thinking more, taking a couple more steps back, thinking more in the more professional military education, strategic thinking, strategic thought perspective, I think at least in Department of Defense, heavy, intelligence community circles and others as well thinking about the blending of the lines, or crossing of lines between war and peace, and kind of that area that sometimes is referred to as gray, and what it means in terms of the tools that we have available to us to reach. Bond and without eliciting eliciting a conventional military response and breaking out into like full scale overt war, these issues are still being discussed today, quite a lot among you know, these types of circles and academics as well, and I don't think that's going to go away again, fueled at least by not only what we're seeing by Russia, but also the PRC in the Indo Pacific as well, and Iran with all of its proxies, and also the fact that Iran has used some irregular hybrid tools as well, and then a number of non state actors doing the same thing. I don't think these tactics or the tools are going to go away. If anything, they'll be even more enhanced by the emergence of these new technologies and the continued evolution of existing technologies as

Tad Schnaufer: 35:49

well, right? Because it's interesting that if these tactics, the in and of themselves, were successful, why would Russia need to actually invade in 2022 so you had so what pushed him over the edge? From your perspective,

Dr. John Pennell: 36:03

sure, it's a great question, I guess the million dollar question from my perspective, I think initially, I think even to this day, I think obviously Moscow is has over played its hand and overstretched itself. Obviously, was overly confident going into Ukraine in 2014 to begin with. And obviously that's not worked out whatsoever. I think it misunderstood Ukrainian resilience, and I think Ukrainian innovation, particularly on the battlefield. To this day, I'm still in close contact with number of Ukrainians, including the military and just the amount of innovation going on, because, you know, their their nationhood is at stake, and they're really fighting for their lives. And I think, you know, deserve some some credit to think, on their part, for thinking through ways to counter these different threats, but in terms of the question about maybe what changed in Russia's perspective, I think initially, at least, I think the Kremlin was satisfied with as long as it had a foothold either in Crimea or Eastern or southern Ukraine. But that, in and of itself, would mitigate anytime soon, at least in their perspective, Ukraine's ability to enter the European Union as a member or as a member of NATO. And so I think at least at that time, I think the Kremlin was satisfied with that. And I think also was using that interim period before 2022 to continue to undermine the then Poroshenko government, and then afterwards, the Zelensky government, all the reforms that Ukraine had to undertake related to corruption, transparency in a number of the areas as well. And so I think that the Kremlin thought that it would be able to eventually kind of oust Zelensky, if not Poroshenko before him, and put in a more pliable regime, but I think over the years, I think the Kremlin also thought that the NATO and kind of Western alliance on Ukraine would fracture. And while there had been some challenges at different periods of time over the last, let's say, 10 or so years, it's mostly held together. And so I think maybe he underestimated that Putin himself. And so I think, seeing as how Ukraine was proceeding quite rapidly on its internal reforms, in my view, I think the Kremlin and Putin himself just said it's not enough that we have a foothold in Ukraine. Let's promote our own version of Ukrainian history and install our own kind of puppet, if you will. And so I think the focus then became from one transition from destabilization of Ukraine to just regime change. But again, I know also many in the West thought that it would be relatively short battle in February 2022, and here we are three plus years later, and that's not at all the case. So I just think Russia made a lot of strategic mistakes and miscalculations, let alone operational tactical as well. But I really think just their overall objective shifted from destabilization to regime change, and I think that's what I would argue, is the main reason for the change in February 2022

Tad Schnaufer: 39:25

right? So the gray zone activities, gray zone operations, can only yield so much change, and in the end, they pretty much, you had to go all the way conventional to make to reach a new goal, if you will. Is it right? Because, right? Because if we look at the narrative right before the invasion in 22 you know, Putin wrote his famous article in July of 2021 calling, you know, Ukrainian French brothers. And then he used in his speech during the night of the invasion about the de nazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, same like you mentioned in 2014 same things, trying to fight this fascist government. So the messaging is almost the same. It's just the new goal. Goals. Is what you're seeing is really that flip switch?

Dr. John Pennell: 40:03

Yeah, definitely. And again, I think obviously us, you know, Western support has been extremely important to Ukraine, and you know, it's good that it's continued. And you know, I know that we also have some challenges with whether on budget, budget situation the United States, but I know that Ukraine really needs us and Western support. But I think is again, also showed a lot of resilience and innovation in terms of its ability to maneuver on the battleground, both physically, but also in the cyber and information realms as well,

Tad Schnaufer: 40:42

right? And so based on your analysis, where does Russia sit today, with its obviously the current war in Ukraine, and also it's still hanging on to some bases in Syria. So what's the current assessment? From your perspective?

Dr. John Pennell: 40:52

I definitely think that, again, Russia's overplayed its hands, unfortunately, many times, and is overstretched. I think there's only enough people who are going to continue to kind of go through the meat grinder, at least voluntarily in Ukraine. Obviously, a lot of it is involuntary. I am hoping that, and I know there's been a lot of talk about some some peace negotiations that, you know, we do get to that point, because obviously a lot of people are suffering, and, you know, both Ukrainians and Russians, but something that is fair to Ukraine. I don't think that Russia, or Putin himself is interested in any deal that doesn't benefit Russia only. So that's somewhat where I'm concerned about how this would continue or not continue going forward. But I don't think it's necessarily sustainable for Russia to continue at this pace. On the other hand, I'm not sure it's sustainable for Ukraine to do so without continuous support from the US and its allies and partners and so, you know, hence the need, I think, to find a way to bring the parties together and come up with a negotiated settlement that's fair. I think we just, we just have to see, I think it's going to be tough, a tough slog, kind of going forward.

Tad Schnaufer: 42:24

And what about in Syria?

Dr. John Pennell: 42:27

So in Syria, I I'm glad that we are taking a new approach in terms of, you know, outreach. I know there, there are a lot of valid concerns about the leadership in Syria, you know, based on historical experience with this individual and some of the organizations he's associated with, but, you know, the flip side of it, I think it does warrant a new approach, in the sense that some of the things that we've done in the Middle East haven't necessarily worked out well. I think there's still some hope in certain cases, such as in Iraq, despite all the challenges over the years, that there may be some, some promise, some hope coming forward that, you know, maybe this is, you know, our renewed outreach and approach to Syria could be an opportunity to kind of shape at least Syria and their thinking, about Russia, about Iran, about non state actors. So I think we have to try, and I think it is worth trying. Russia, obviously, to get in the way, has had a long standing involvement in Syria, I think, to the extent that maybe the US or our partners and allies could influence leadership's thinking regarding to Russia and its access to naval and air bases, I think would be to our benefit. It may also kind of, like you with Ukraine, require some kind of negotiated deal, if you will, as to what is in the US and Europe centers, let alone what Russia wants out of it. I think we also kind of have to wait and see, but I do think it's good that we've conducted some proactive outreach in trying to figure out what we can do with Syria going forward, just given how how much suffering there's been in Syria as well domestically, pride USF falling, but then also resulting, unfortunately, from indiscriminate Russian bombing campaigns, particularly during 2015, and 16, a lot of civilians were killed as well. I think we have to see right?

Tad Schnaufer: 44:30

So to wrap up, if you could tell a senior US policy maker in one sentence, what they need to do with Russia. Now I'm just really concise, one sentence. Blip. You caught him on an elevator. What would you tell what would you tell

Dr. John Pennell: 44:42

them? Yeah, this is great question. And of course, I have a lot to say. Try to keep it. Keep it concise. I think it's extremely important to think about the threats and challenges that are both competitors but also adversaries present to us. Without necessarily having to rely on or use traditional kinetic or military tools, and that a lot of warfare going forward is, can it see more and more of what we've seen like in Ukraine, at least prior to February 2022, but still to this day that the use of these advanced, emerging, evolving technologies to achieve strategic objectives, and I think we need to inoculate our country and our allies and partners to that from cyber to AI enabled DIS and misinformation to be more careful on our smartphones and use social media apps being mindful of, you know, disinformation seeping into our own political ecosystems, and, you know, causing instability, etc, and decreasing social cohesion our own countries. I think these things are going to be out there. And if not get get more difficult. And then, relatedly, terms the whole of the society approach, getting the private sector, because these types of activities ultimately will affect their bottom line, non governmental organizations, academic think tanks, etc, etc, along with the whole of government approach to kind of dealing with these challenges, I think, will be critical.

Tad Schnaufer: 46:18

Well, thank you so much for your insight. Thank you. Applause.