What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Understanding the Taliban to Shape U.S. Policy

In this episode of GNSI’s “At the Boundary” podcast, Arman Mahmoudian, PhD, interviews Marvin G. Weinbaum, PhD, who is senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Drawing on his recent article, “Our Knowledge of the Taliban as Guide for US Policy” ( which was recently published in the Journal of Strategic Security), Dr. Weinbaum offers a detailed assessment of the collapse of the Afghan state and the return of the Taliban in 2021.

This episode discusses:

• Why the U.S. failed at state-building and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
• The shift from counterterrorism to democratic nation-building
• Weinbaum’s analysis of Afghan leadership under Karzai and Ghani, and how their governance choices helped shape the state’s collapse
• Fragmentation within the Taliban leadership
• How the presence of ISIS-K pressures Taliban unity and policy
• The collapse of U.S. military support and Afghan troop morale
• Dangers of a failed Taliban state and the regional risk of civil war
• Weinbaum’s direct message to Afghans affected by the regime change

Throughout the interview, Weinbaum emphasizes that U.S. disengagement has reduced its leverage on critical issues like human rights, warning that effective diplomacy with the Taliban requires long-term engagement, not conditional demands. He also argues that continued absence risks ceding influence to regional powers already moving toward recognition.

 Links from the episode:

• Register for CyberBay Here!

• GNSI Tampa Summit 5 Report (March 2025) The Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for Future Conflicts

• The Latest Journal of Strategic Security (JSS)

• GNSI’s Axis of Resistance Research Initiative Playlist

At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

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Transcript

Jim Cardoso: 0:00

Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's episode of at the boundary, a podcast from the global and national security Institute at the University of South Florida. I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Director GNSI and your host for at the boundary. On today's episode, we're going to turn our attention to Afghanistan while that country is not currently grabbing headlines, Afghanistan remains vital to the United States's relationships within the region. Our guest today will be Dr Marvin Weinbaum, director of the Afghanistan and Pakistan studies programs at the Middle East Institute. Before we get to that discussion, couple of things to tell you about. We're excited to announce that we'll be hosting one of the country's most influential conferences on national security and cyberspace. Cyber beacon 2025 the flagship annual event for national defense University's College of Information and cyberspace, will be held on USF Tampa campus on October 16. GNSI is partnering with CIC to hold cyber beacon outside of Washington, DC for the first time in the 12 year history of the conference, we will convene leading voices from the US, military, Allied defense institutions, government agencies, academia and the private sector to explore cutting edge developments in cyber strategy, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. The agenda is available on our website, and look for official announcements on the speaker lineup in the near future. Registration will open soon, so keep an eye out. Cyber beacon will cap off a big week in Tampa, following up on the cyber Bay event in downtown Tampa. From October 13 through the 15th, registration is open for this event, which will feature GNSI Executive Director, retired Marine Corps General Frank McKenzie, as one of the keynote speakers. GNSI will put on a national security focused panel for the conference, and you can find out more@cyberbay.org on the publications front, we recently published the conference report for GNSI Tampa summit five. Theme of the summit was the Russia, Ukraine war lessons for future conflicts. You can find the report on our website. We also just published a special printed edition of our most recent issue of the Journal of strategic security. This issue focuses on Afghanistan and features leading experts, including Dr Weinbaum. It's the first printed issue in the 18 year history of the journal, and we plan on transitioning to more printed issues in the future. The electronic version remains available via our website. But let's now turn to our conversation with Dr Weinbaum. He's professor emeritus at the University of Illinois, a former State Department official and currently serves as a director of Afghanistan and Pakistan studies programs at the Middle East Institute. His article is titled, our knowledge of the Taliban as guide for US policy, and argues for breaking new ground in the tumultuous USF gnst and relationship and shaking off established thinking. In engaging the Taliban, we encourage you to read the article yourself, but the author sat down with GNSI Research Fellow, Dr Armon mahmoudian, for an in depth discussion.

Arman Mahmoudian: 3:36

Well, Dr Weinbaum, once again, thank you for joining us. It's a great pleasure to be with you. My pleasure at the GNSI, we had the an honor of the hosting you in November of the 2024 which we had a policy dialog event on Afghanistan, and you spoke at our third panel. Later on, you kindly also gave us the pleasure of, you know, publishing an article in order in our journal, Journal of strategic security. Your article was published under the name of our knowledge of Taliban as a guide for US policy in our article, one of the things that you touch is that what happened, why, after the two decades of endeavor by our US and its allies, local and international, Taliban, Afghanistan, fell into the hand of Taliban in August of 2021 I want to start with this question, which might be a spoiler. All out. I want to ask you that, what could have united said done to prevent the fall of Afghanistan, if you go back in the time, what move would any move would have changed? Well, look,

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 4:38

I think we really have to get the big picture here, we have to ask why. You know, what did we attempt to do that we failed at? Why did we try to do this? After all, United States had pretty much killed. And up on Afghanistan in the 90s, except for Bin Laden. We were concerned about Bin Laden, but otherwise, we really didn't care whether the Taliban regime survived or not. We did not have regime change as one of our objectives. And I can say that because I was in the State Department at the time, and I know that for a fact that we did not want to get involved. But what changed then? Of course, it was 911 and and now, in order to get rid of bin Laden we had to get rid of the Taliban they had given, given them an opportunity to turn them over, but they rejected. So there we were. We found ourselves in Afghanistan, where we hadn't expected to be, obviously, but with air power, we were able to very quickly get the upper hand. But we had the now the responsibility of this country. So it faced. We were faced with two challenges, neither of which, again, we wanted, but more and more we found ourselves being drawn into now. What were the challenges? The first one was obviously that we were involved here in it had to be state building, because there were no there were no institutions left. So we had no choice, but if we were going to leave without having things go back to the way they were, we had to leave with some institutions which would stabilize the situation. The second challenge was the challenge of suppression of an insurgency. And interestingly, that challenge did not appear except Oh, by 2005 certainly by 2006 when it was realized that this was serious, this was a serious challenge to the new Afghan state. Okay, so we, we. This was our our goal. How were we going to deal with this? Well, we were going to leave it to the Afghans, pretty much, to pick their own president, although we had a role in that too, since they couldn't agree on it, we we were going to have them write their own constitution, fine and meanwhile, we just couldn't walk away while they were doing this, and they would need a few years to settle in. And it didn't seem to be any particular rush, especially by 2003 when we get pulled off Afghanistan, almost completely because of Iraq, the invasion of Iraq. So we have very few people on the ground there, and very little commitment, but we're there. We we found that the wasn't an insurgency, as I say, until four or five, and by then, we had to deal with it, but once again, now with all of our resources, pretty much in Iraq. Now I bring this up because winning, building a state is a very difficult job. It takes decades. You have to build the institutions. You got to develop the supporting norms to go with it. And we specified we didn't want any state. Wanted a democratic state correct, so it had to meet that condition.

Arman Mahmoudian: 9:39

So basically, if I stand Correct, yeah, you're saying that there was a change of mission right after getting into the Afghanistan, from countering al Qaeda to nation state.

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 9:50

Well, we didn't, you know, we all the only mission we had, really, was to get rid of bin Laden, yes, but once we got into it, you couldn't. Get away without facing the fact that you had to leave something in its place. We're faced with the same situation now in Gaza, yes, if you can't simply win, you got to leave something in it to to to assume authority. So here we were taking on what is normally a job which takes years to do. That's true with the insurgency as well, that when you're in an asymmetrical kind of insurgency where all your opponent has to do is to survive. You've got to win. All he has to do is to survive. So why did we fail here and on the state side? We failed. Unfortunately, the people in positions of leadership were not really well, let me put it this way. I think that they were often well meaning, talking about mainly Karzai and Ghani, in that they wanted the best for their people. And yes, they wanted a democratic system that they could control, but in order to succeed, they needed to have the support of people, and for that, they needed their loyalty, and their loyalty could not be gained by saying, Well, we have the legitimacy the way the king could before King says, Well, I'm monarch, and I can do this with a democratic government. The only way to succeed is ultimately through the election process that gives you the legitimacy. And the first election in 2004 went fairly well, but as soon as Howard Karzai got in there with a tribal background, as soon as he got in there, he realized that he couldn't govern without the personal loyalty. Came from a tribal background, a personal loyalty. And in order to get this, he had to do things which ultimately would undermine the state. And this is, this is basically what had happened. So he ends up in appointing people to positions. And GNSI does this later too, who are unqualified but trustworthy. Trustworthy. He ends up appointing a little later, generals and other military people, not because they were proven to have competence, but because they could be trusted. And this immediately saddled the new regime with a very difficult situation, not made easier by the fact that the US couldn't do wasn't going to do anything else except pour money in for programs, and then a little later, for the military, and whereas it was needed if they were going to succeed and have something to show for what they were doing. Even though it was needed, all it did was to feed the corruption that was sustaining the regime. So what we have to see is that the State Building and insurgency suppression are one the same. One can't exist really, without one, you can't see succeed in one without the other. And that's and that was what we really ran into. I, I the state ran into particular problems by 2009 and then 14, because those were election years, and the it was therefore going to be the job of the of the people in power if they wanted to stay in power. And. Win that election, whatever it took. So in the process those elections nine, and I was one observer for the nine election, and then in the and then in the 14 election, same clearly, those elections were fraudulent. The process leading up to them was fraudulent. All of this adds up to the fact that, meanwhile, the public is becoming more and more disillusioned the that the government by its incompetence, by its corruption, by the way in which it is sustained power is alienating the population. They're alienating the population now, it's not that the people wanted the general public wanted, for the most part, the Taliban to return to power their their memory of the first administer, the first Taliban emirate was one they they didn't want to Go back to that, but they were on the fence, and they run the on the fence. I should add to all of this that on the military, the US, okay, the US ultimately becomes more heavily engaged. Now, what does it do in 2009 1011, I 11, up to 14, where it then reduces them, it pours troops in, but its troops really are trained to do, to engage in warfare, other than what really was required. This is a guerrilla war. Tanks aren't of much value. Planes are. Tanks aren't of value. What is of great value is that you've got to establish relationships, and that means you got to work in the countryside. You got to realize that the real, the real governance that goes on in the country is really taking place locally. You've got, it's in the village councils. And we tried to address this, we tried the US and our and our allies to to place people into the local areas, but for the most part, they they weren't trained for this, and then they only stayed for a year and then left. So whatever, whatever kinds of relationships were established, were then severed, because the people who were sent were leaving.

Arman Mahmoudian: 18:17

I have a quick follow up questions. You know, you mentioned that after 911 your this, the United States Government asked Talibans to hand out a lot and people around him. Over a couple months ago, something went viral in the social media some of the outlets that the Taliban claims so some of the Taliban leaders claims that United States gave them, initially 48 hours of ultimatum. But President Bush didn't wait out to 48 hours to be over, and he made the decision to attack prior to the you know, to reaching the deadline. Is there any truth to it? Or Taliban is just trying to just shift the blame for the war?

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 19:01

Not sure I'm following you, but are you saying that a deal could have been arranged with the Taliban?

Arman Mahmoudian: 19:09

Yes. The reason that I'm saying is that because of the some of the figures close to Saul Taliban, maker has made a claim that United States didn't wait for the ultimatum deadline to be reached, they make the decision to attack Afghanistan prior to the deadline.

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 19:27

Prior Yeah,

Unknown: 19:29

yes, no,

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 19:31

again, I was on the inside.

Unknown: 19:33

That's why I'm asking yes, yeah,

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 19:37

up until the 11th Hour, working through general Mahmoud, who was then the liaison between Pakistan and the Taliban leadership. Omar, particularly well. Omar, we held out to them that. We're not going to attack, if you'll only give us and run. That's all we that's all we really want. This may be apocryphal, but supposedly the Mullah Omar said to Mahmoud that I don't believe the Americans are going to attack Wow. And if they do, we'll defeat them. And if we don't defeat them now, we'll defeat them later. Well, you know, there's that. But I thought you were also referring to the fact that after the US attacked and the Taliban fled to Pakistan, almost almost intact, it fled to Pakistan that the Taliban then said, Okay, We're willing to enter into a deal, we will now be willing to join with others for an inclusive government. Well, of course, that's what we have wanted them to say in recent years, that they will, but the way it was read at the time was sure now that they've been defeated and they want to keep their hand in the game that they'll say they can do this now it overlooks the fact that At the bond conference, it was exceedingly difficult to reach any kind of agreement. They They argued and they argued. Ultimately, Karzai was appointed, but only because of the Iranians and the Russians. Well, put pressure on Karzai. Yeah, on the warlords, if you will, put pressure on them. So the idea that you could have then injected the Taliban into this new government, I can't see possible. It would have never reached an agreement if the Taliban were sitting at the table, it was nice to know that that was a possibility. As far as you know, they were willing to do it, but they were doing for obvious reasons, and now just to wind up on this, I I think that what really undermined the US as much as anything was the fact that its policy was never consistent. It was constantly being readjusted. It, as I mentioned, the rotation personnel undercut it, but up until a few months until the end of the regime of the Republic, it would have still been possible for the Taliban regime to hold on longer. It didn't have to collapse

Unknown: 23:22

for the Afghanistan

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 23:26

regime, but once it became clear that the US really was leaving, then it was inevitable. And of course, then it came apart very quickly, particularly inevitable, because the US was not going to leave behind any forces, and particularly also because what the Afghan Military needed most of all was American air power, yes, and without the air power, they could not support their troops on the ground, and morale just collapsed

Arman Mahmoudian: 24:13

for various variety of reason. And as you said, the rule that Americans played, the rule that the very foundation of that is the new state of Afghanistan. At the beginning, the regime fell, and now we have Taliban too in Afghanistan. And when it comes to the new Taliban, there is, as you know, better than most people, there is an argument out there that this Taliban might be different from previous and they mostly point out to the differences between Kabul and Kandahar. There is a speculation out there that Sarah Jean Haqqani, the Ministry of the Interior, who is in Kabul mostly, and hey batola hunzada. Leader in the panda or they don't get along. The rumors suggest that the hack money wants a better or more relations with the rest of the world is pro isolation. I want to ask you that to what extent you can verify, can you very will you verify these rumors? Do you think there is a division, and if there is a division, what that say about the new Afghanistan?

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 25:23

First of all, let's compare the emirate, second emirate with the first. Thank you. In some respects, they're very much alike on particularly on social policy and on their political repression, it would be hard to distinguish them In that regard, the Emirate of the 90s was really a hermit state. It was isolated from the world. Kabul was a dead city. Everybody had left. I know I was in Kabul a few months after the Taliban took over and walked around, and it was so sad, because I had lived in Kabul years earlier. I knew what a fun city. It really was, in some respects, certainly a very engaging place. I it was just sad. I didn't, well, not that that has changed, but I didn't see a woman on on the street in all the time I was there. Oh, except for some very elderly women who were begging. So the social policies, especially on the women and the political repression, hasn't changed much but, but the second emirate is different. It has many of the same people in the leadership who were active in the 90s, to be sure, but it also has a younger generation who have come through, and they're at the second level, and they're making a difference, however, gradually that will be but in generally, it's not a hermit state. It's an the state is more open. It's more porous. It's possible for many people to go and visit Kabul, to walk around the city. The big change of course, from a few years ago is it's now safe to walk around any, pretty much anywhere in the country. So yes, women are being criminally, I think, confined, their ambitions crushed, and the population feels the heavy weight of the repression. But there are many people who are returning, who the who it was thought would be arrested immediately. Some have but in general, the Taliban has welcomed back those people with talents that they don't have. It's a mixed picture. Yeah. Now that brings us to what you were just saying, factionalism. Having said all this, there are some serious differences, serious differences among the leadership, certainly on strategy, but on principles, even the so called more moderates and the hard liners don't really different. Differ that much, if at all. What they differ on are their strategies. That is, if we're not going to have women in education, are there perhaps some other ways to keep women separated without completely ending education? So that you know there and there are many other areas too, where the the more moderate Taliban are open to dialog. They they welcome dialog. Whereas the Kandahar Shura, which is where the top leadership. And Zaida is there. They don't meet with anyone. They're completely insulated. But they are the people who ultimately are making the decisions. Now there are strong differences here. Their ambitions are being thwarted. People think that they should be leading, rather than our concern have at all? Yes, ah, there are people who think so, but and we hear from time to time that they're going to challenge, that they're going to challenge. Well, the truth is that whenever the rubber hits the road is they back off, and the reason that they do that is the Taliban leadership for all of its differences, has come to the conclusion that what's more important than anything else is that they hang together, that if they begin to divide, that the whole movement is in jeopardy. So take, for example, the Haqqanis are a major element of the of the Taliban. They didn't used to be. They used to be separately. They're in an alliance, but, but now the Haqqani family, especially Siraj Uddin, the Haqqanis, are powerful, and yet they have not really thrown down the gauntlet, as we say, he had them really challenged them because they fear factionalism, disunity will lead to disintegration of the movement. I suspect that we're going to see this remain pretty much as it is, for at least the time being.

Arman Mahmoudian: 32:25

I appreciate you confirming the you know, the fragmentation which brings us to the next stage and the last stages about what the US policy should be

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 32:34

before we do that, I want to mention that the there is an element here. One of the things that also keeps Taliban together is, is k is that is Islamic State? Dash, yes, the fear that if they start to divide, some of the elements that lose out will join ISK, not Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is pretty much out of the picture now, wow. They have never really been a major factor except helping with recruitment and finances, and they may still be doing that. They're really and maybe, maybe they are plotting. You don't need too many people to have a plot, but it really is, is k, and at the moment, they're locked into a competition is K says we are the true carriers of what the Taliban beliefs are all about. You're not living up to the ideals of the movement we are. And so there's constant pressure on them to maintain a if they if they compromise on the women's issue, they've got to be fearful that the talent that is k dash will capitalize on this, and that this will strengthen their movement, because, again, they want to replace the leadership that exists there. Now they won't be able to do it in the near run, in the near run, but they're looking ahead, and they think that they've got a chance now, if they can just begin to see some kind of disintegration of the current leadership and the leadership therefore recognizing this has additional. Reason to hang together.

Arman Mahmoudian: 35:02

Now the question is, what should the United States do in this middle first of all, should United States try to meddle in the Haqqani Heba Tola conflict and take a side? Should United States believe the Afghanistan as it be? What do you suggest to the current administration the ones after to about their Afghanistan policy should be an Afghanistan policy together at all.

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 35:26

Well, look, no, the US should not try to somehow divide the Taliban. That will fail. Let me come back to that. I think if we're looking now at the future, which I think your question is getting at the future of US policy, what are our options, that if we're looking at the future of the Taliban, that very likely, five years from now, Afghanistan will look pretty much the way it does today. There's been very little change from 2021, when they took over, to now. It's going on now.

Unknown: 36:15

Four years in August,

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 36:18

four years, we really haven't seen that it has evolved very much. Yes, in some ways, it's receded. It's gotten more oppressive in certain respects. But generally speaking, the Taliban have never been willing to compromise. They've been willing to negotiate, but they've always waited for their interlocutors to make the concessions. This has remained the same. They've stacked they've been true to their their major core or their core principles. What is really different now is, as I was suggesting before, is that there, there is this openness here to the outside world. That's one issue on which the hard line is the moderates disagree. The moderates have lost out on social policy. They have succeeded in getting the regime to be open to the rest of the world. One of the major goals, consistently since August 21 it's been to get international political recognition, and whereas they have still not received it from any country except most recently, Russia, there's no doubt that within the next year there will be a large number of countries that establish diplomatic relations. So even in this period of time before the current there has been de facto recognition, the reason being that there are countries, particularly in the region, that have reason to want to engage with the Taliban. They have common interests. The neighbors are very concerned about economic integration. It's impossible to have integration in the region if you leave Afghanistan out. It's right in the middle. All the roads run through Afghanistan, all the pipelines through Afghanistan. So the Afghans, you know, have not yielded on what the international community wanted most, and that's been that there being more integrative leadership. Because what they wanted was to be able to put into the leadership people who were loyal to them, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, but the Taliban has been able to withstand any kind of pressure to include new elements in the neighbors, I say, would most of them, if they had their choice, would rather another regime than the Taliban, but it's the Taliban regime that They've all concluded is it's going to be around for quite a while yet, and we're going to have to live with it, and we might as well have faced that fact. Therefore, all of the calls here that they should be supporting the opposition. Including the armed resistance groups, the National Resistance Front, for example, they rejected. Everyone has rejected this. Why? Because they're fearful that however much they would rather see a regime other than the Taliban, which would be easier to get along with if the Taliban fails Now, if that, if the Taliban state fails, now there won't be a replacement state. There will be anarchy, wow. There will be free for all, where Islamic State and and all the various factions will be making claims, including the neighbors. The neighbors will get drawn in. They'll have their proxies, so we'll have a wild civil war. That seems to be the what is keeping the international community from really undertaking any efforts which would in any way undermine this regime again, as much as they want. Now, finally, I think, what about us, policy, the US among all the nations, pretty much has is least engaged with Afghanistan. It does deal with Afghanistan on very narrow grounds where it must absolutely such as getting people out of the country. But the US does have interests there with Taliban, that if weren't engaged, it could develop, particularly in the area of counter terrorism, because if Al Qaeda Daesh is a threat, then it's also a threat to the Taliban. So they don't want they're not in favor of seeing terrorist, terrorist groups camping down as many are in the country. And then there are also these insurgency groups that are against the regimes in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Iran, so it would open up a can of worms. Really were there to be instability in the country now, now the US is mainly kept from making any changes in its policy because of the women's issue, it is such a hot topic as it should be, for not just the United States, but others that one that is so offensive, it would be difficult in the United States to get congressional support, to get public support for policy which did not make some progress on the women's issue. What we know this is one where the Taliban have really dug in their heels. It's for them a test of their faith. Does that mean that the US must forever give up on the issue? I don't think so. I think if the United States were to look at this in a fresh way, they could come to the conclusion that we can establish more engaged we can create more engagement with the Taliban than we have now. Well, I'm for doing that in order to do that, to help cultivate that next generation of Taliban leaders who will be much more inclined to take a softer line on the women's issue, who have recognized, as they do, among among the more moderate types, that's the right word, pragmatic types. They recognize that they've paid it heavy, heavy price for their stand on women's issues, it has been the number one issue which has made it difficult for them to get the acceptance that they want. What I'm suggesting here is that conditional diplomacy will not work. The Taliban Don't bargain. They're not transactional. You have to convince them, if you want to make progress with them, that what you're asking them to do is in their interests as well as yours. And I think we can do that. It's not something. We can do on, on the short term, in the short term, and it certainly isn't anything we can do by by somehow staying out when all the other countries in the region and in the world, pretty much now, are engaging the Taliban for the US to be the great holdout in saying on principle, we can't do it. Their influence is expanding. US influence is receding. And so our ability to push that one issue of human rights, which we care about more than anybody else, also becomes less potent, because we're not there making the case at the moment. Now there has, and there has not been, since August of 21 an American diplomat on the ground in all this time. That makes no sense. Thank you, Marvin.

Arman Mahmoudian: 46:01

I want to you know, to and that take us to the last question. If I want to ask you that, what would be your message to our to those of our audience who are from Afghanistan, what would you tell to them

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 46:16

that I feel for you, particularly those who have lost everything, who have left behind family, and those who are protected now, and the dreamers, I think that this is is a blot on American foreign policy. This is something that the US will be ashamed of going forward, and I would tell them, Don't be unrealistic about what you can accomplish, but don't give up either.

Arman Mahmoudian: 46:53

Thank you. Dr Weinberg, well, once again, it was a pleasure for us at the GNSI to host you. I'm very much grateful for the opportunity. Thank you for your insight. Thank

Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum: 47:05

you for the opportunity. Thank you.

Jim Cardoso: 47:11

A special thanks to Marvin Weinbaum and Armand mahmoudian for their conversation today. It's always valuable to hear straight from the author and explore the nuances of his written analysis of note. Armon is currently leading a special research project for GNSI called the Axis of Resistance. You can find that project on our YouTube channel. Next week, on at the boundary, we'll talk to author, professor and academic entrepreneur Namrata Goswami. She's a professor of space security at Johns Hopkins University, and an instructor of emerging technologies and unconventional warfare at the Joint Special Operations University. We'll be talking to her about space defense and, of course, the golden dome concept. Make sure you don't miss it or any other episodes of at the boundary by hitting that subscribe button. Thanks for listening today. If you like the podcast, please subscribe and let your friends and colleagues know. You can also follow GNSI and our LinkedIn and X accounts at USF, underscore GNSI And check out our website as well at usf.edu/gnsi, when you're there, don't forget to subscribe to our monthly newsletter that's going to wrap up this episode of at the boundary. Each new episode will feature global and national security issues we found to be insightful, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall, just worth talking about, I'm Jim Cardoso, and we'll see you at the boundary. You.