Inside the Golden Dome: Can the U.S. Stop Missiles in Space?

In this episode of GNSI’s  At the Boundarypodcast, Dr. Tad Schnaufer sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami, professor of space security at Johns Hopkins University, to unpack one of the most ambitious U.S. defense projects in decades: the Golden Dome missile defense system.

Announced by the Trump administration in January 2025, the Golden Dome aims to protect the United States by intercepting missiles—including hypersonic threats—in both their boost and terminal phases. The system relies on a proliferated constellation of space-based sensors and interceptors, with the first demonstration expected by 2028.

The discussion explores the history of missile defense, the technological leaps that make Golden Dome possible, and the strategic implications for U.S. security, NATO allies, and global power competition. From the Cold War’s “Star Wars” program to today’s hypersonic challenge, this episode provides crucial insight into how space and missile defense are reshaping national and international security.

If you’re interested in U.S. defense strategy, missile defense, space security, or geopolitics, this is an episode you won’t want to miss.

Links from the episode:

• Register for CyberBay Here!

• Armies to Algorithms: AI’s Role in National Defense Interview with Guest Retired Colonel Nancy Blacker

At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

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The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.

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Transcript

Jim Cardoso: 0:00

Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's episode of at the boundary, the podcast from the global and national security Institute at the University of South Florida. I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Director for GNSI, and your host for at the boundary. Today on the podcast, we're going to talk to Dr Namrata Goswami, Professor of space security at Johns Hopkins University. Our interview today will focus on the Space Defense Initiative announced by the White House earlier this year, better known as the Golden Dome. She spoke recently with her own GNSI strategy and research manager, Dr Tad schnaufer, about the obvious advantages of the Golden Dome and the just as obvious dangers and disadvantages, including the significant cost before we get to their discussion. However, a couple notes to tell you about if you're listening to this episode, before October 16, 2025 mark that date on your calendar as GNSI will host cyber beacon 2025 here at USF. Cyber beacon is held annually by the College of Information and cyberspace at the National Defense University, and it's one of the country's most influential conferences on national security with a focus on cybersecurity. This will be the first time in its 12 year history, cyber beacon will be held outside the NDU campus in Washington DC. Registration will open soon, so keep an eye on your emails and our website for updates in prep for that conference, hop over to our YouTube site to see our interview with retired Army Colonel Nancy blacker. She's now the chair for the cyber strategy department at NDU. She discussed cyber beacon and the work going on at CIC in cybersecurity and AI towards the US national defense strategy. Check out the video for a head start on the conference themes, and be sure to register to hear from Nancy and many other cybersecurity experts and practitioners. On October 16, staying with the cybersecurity theme, we want to offer a big congratulations to USF cyberherd team who took home the first place trophy in the capture the flag competition recently at DEF CON 33 one of the world's largest and longest running conferences for the hacker community, the cyber herd team defeated 90 other teams, including three time defending champion from Singapore's Cyber Security Agency. We all conjure images in our minds when we hear the term hacker. But the truth of the matter is, hacking expertise is a vital component to cybersecurity and national security. This victory for cyber herd is a prime example of the Legion of talent we have at USF and the outstanding tech AI cybersecurity and national security environment. Developing here in Tampa Bay. All right, let's move to our discussion, to the Golden Dome missile defense system. In January of this year, President Trump signed an executive order directing the US armed forces to construct a missile defense system similar in nature to the Iron Dome that defends Israel. Our guest today on the podcast, Namrata gaswami is a professor of space security at Johns Hopkins University. She spoke recently with her own Tad schnaufer about the golden dome. Let's drop in for a listen. Well,

Tad Schnaufer: 3:39

welcome to the podcast, thank you for having me. Ted. Excellent. So today we're going to talk about the golden dome, which was announced by the Trump administration earlier earlier this year, and just try to get a little bit of the base kind of facts or the assumptions that are around that program. So if you don't mind just starting us off, so what's the golden dome and what's its primary purpose? Yes,

Dr Namrata Goswami: 3:57

absolutely. So before I answer that question, I do have to issue a disclaimer. Everything I say today is my own perspective based on my open source research research, and does not represent the perspective of the US, Space Force, the Air Force or the Department of Defense. So now to answer your question, what exactly is the golden dome? So for your audience, the Golden Dome was a memo, an executive memo, that President Trump put out on January 27 2025 and the idea is that the United States will build a missile defense system that is going to be able to intercept incoming missiles, especially featuring boost phase and terminal phase capabilities. By boost phase, I mean interceptor capability that can actually counter a missile when it's actually being launched. So that's something very new that the golden dome memo is putting out. And then. It also talks about intercepting at the terminal phase. So terminal phase is when the missile has already been launched and it's in space, so where it spends about 20 minutes, it's a harder place to intercept. But that's part of the memo as well. And then the most important thing about the memo is that it is hoping that it can intercept hypersonic which is faster than Mac five, as well as ballistic missile tracking sensor. And then finally, what the golden dome memo actually clearly articulates is to build a proliferated constellation of space based architecture that is going to be able to offer you the sensors and the ability to detect something that is moving so fast. So ultimately, to make it simple, what it actually does is that it is trying and attempting to build a defense based architecture that secures the US homeland, Hawaii as well from any adversary missiles that might be coming at it, especially from air. And so that's what the golden dome wants to do, and it wants to do it for hypersonic missiles as well.

Tad Schnaufer: 6:11

So people might imagine the golden domes like a protective dome over the United States. But like you mentioned, a lot of the strikes might happen in the boost phase. So is it, does it have a global reach? Is it anticipated have a global reach being able to hit a missile somewhere far away before even gets close to the US homeland?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 6:28

Yes, because one of the technologies that the golden dome is encouraging the Department of Defense to do, and the DOD has responded to that in terms of what architecture they are thinking so this particular capability is being developed by the DOD, in collaboration with some of its own organizations, like the Space Development Agency, the missile development agency and the MDA, especially in collaboration with the Space Development Agency, is developing the hypersonic and ballistic tracking sensor, HB, tss, which is basically a medium filled of view. So what I mean by that, and I'll answer your question about the reach of the Golden Dome. So what this does is that it actually places sensors in space, which will mean separate several constellation of satellites get that can actually track missiles, especially at the boost phase, because that's where it's a single target, and you can actually know it's heat shield. So in that context, while we argue or point out that this is only focused on defending the US homeland, the reach is global, because it's space based. So any allies, partner nations that say sign an agreement with the United States, or whether us is treaty bound to come to its defense like Japan will benefit, because the reach is global. It's not just limited to the US homeland.

Tad Schnaufer: 7:53

That's really interesting. So is this technology new, or is this building off of existing us technologies, maybe Israeli technologies from the Iron Dome, which it's obviously compared to, or even earlier us development systems that didn't necessarily make it all the way, like in the 1980s the Strategic Defense Initiative. So do we see those technologies coming up to play here?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 8:15

So great question to us, because the golden dome is actually a continuation of the kind of conversations and very serious development of theoretical technologies during the 1980s with the Strategic Defense Initiative. So these are not new conversations, as you pointed out. So the conversation to protect the US homeland in the 1980s from Soviet Union launch intercontinental ballistic missile started with a very critical figure named Daniel or Graham. He was a army officer, and he was the main intellectual guide behind building this concept of space based interceptors. So in the 1980s and 1990s the conversation was already put forward in a strategic sense, that we cannot depend on a concept called mutually assured destruction, because that means that you're not really deterring missiles from getting into the US homeland. So Graham with others, pointed out that, well, what we really need to think about is space based interceptors that can actually identify missiles coming at the US and defend and deter against them. So basically, in doctrinal terms, it means that you are moving from deterrence by retaliation to deterrence by denial. So it's a very critical phenomenon that happened. What has changed with the golden dome, and which is new, is that unlike the 1980s and the 1990s where adversary nations did not have hypersonic missile capability, so. And so which means you're moving so fast, you have to respond within two to three minutes, right? That's something new. So the golden dome has argued that it's not just going to be a missile as we understand it, the capability should be able to target a missile moving that fast, and that's why the boost phase targeting is so vital. And so that's new. The second thing that is new is that, unlike the 1980s and the 1990s we have much higher quality small satellite constellations that can be built, including cube sets. Instead of having exquisite, really heavy, big satellites, the smaller satellites are faster. Computing is faster and then and with this. The final thing that the golden dome is hoping to achieve is basically to be able to build an architecture that is going to help identify real time tracking. We don't have it yet. Tab. We don't have the capability to do real time tracking as yet. The hope is that with ground based tracking indicator, it's called Moving Target indicator, ground airspace that needs Absolutely, like no latency, like when you're moving in a particular place, I can tell you from 1000s of miles away that this is the now that you're moving so that we can target you. That's what the golden dome is trying to achieve, which is different so that

Tad Schnaufer: 11:26

so the technology is advancing, like you mentioned. But as we saw with those past programs, with the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as Star Wars, in a greater sense and pop culture, if you will, that program never really came to complete fruition as we understand it, because, you know, funding, it took a very long time to develop the technology, and then the Soviet Union obviously collapsed, so the threat wasn't as much pressing. So how long will it take for the gold dome to become operational? Do we see this in the short term, to actually achieve a fully operational concept?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 11:57

So first of all, just to answer your question about the fact that the historical assessment of a space based interceptor or missile defense shield didn't work, not because it was theoretically possible, but because there was a lot of intellectual conversations that happened, especially from the arms control community, that pointed out that, well, if you're going to build a missile defense deterrence by denial capacity, it could lead to escalatory dynamics in space. So that's one of the reason why the Strategic Defense Initiative did not play out with change of administrations from Reagan to George Bush Senior. And then, you know, Obama, George Bush, Jr, there was a lot of change. Clinton, of course, limited the National Missile Defense capability right the ground based interceptor. So there was a lot of reason why the SDI did not play out right. And so, to answer your question, now that we have a golden dome executive memo, January 2025 the timeline that I have seen in open source press conversations by President Trump and others, including from the United States Space Force General goodline, who is in charge of it, we should Have the first level capacity demonstration by 2028 so already the contract has been given out to build the tracking sensor to the space development agency with tranche two. Most important is joint domain command and control that is being developed, because that kind of capability is vital for the golden dome that has already been now contracted out, and so, yeah, by 2028 we should be able to see a demonstration of the first level capacity in this regard. Well,

Tad Schnaufer: 13:51

that's gonna be very interesting. Because, as you said, you know, it gets into this discussion of the weaponization of space. So what are the Russians doing in space, the Chinese and obviously the United States? And in this case, they're putting not necessarily weapons. Necessarily weapons, but interceptor missiles. So is there, is there a fine line here between the defensive interceptor missile going into space compared to what maybe the Russians or the Chinese are doing slash that conversation like you mentioned, that was taking place in the 80s and 90s, about if we weaponize base, it actually will upset deterrence.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 14:20

So the context today. So one of the question that I am dealing in my research is that, why golden dome now? Right? So we have been talking about missile defense shield for a very long time. Morally, the argument given by the advocates is that you cannot let American citizens die from a missile attack, or, you know, be basing it on mutual assured destruction. So I think what is fascinating, actually, I really like your question, because in the context of today, what I'm noticing in the domain of space is that to identify space as a war fighting domain is becoming normal because of the fact. At space based assets, and I'll talk about space based interceptors in a bit, which is not there yet. We don't have space based interceptors of the kind we are talking with the golden dome. We have anti satellite weapon that is ground based, that targets us asset in space and destroys it, or we have non kinetic capability like laser or blinding, right? So, but what has changed is that, because China was the first country to establish a separate space force in 2015 and then talked about scaling up its missile capability. For example, China tested the fractional orbital bombardment system in 2021 which is a nuclear based capability that actually comes at you from the southern side, which our radars are not looking at, and it's hypersonic. It's a hypersonic glide vehicle, and the US at this moment do not have the capability to intercept it, so that was a wake up call in terms of deterring such capacity. So interestingly today, because there is a global utilization of space from a military perspective, the historical conversations around space being a sanctuary space is not a war fighting domain, or shouldn't be, is shifting. And I'll end by saying that one of the biggest evidence of this is not just us or China, but Japan. Japan has historically been very careful of not using language which is not peaceful. Just last week, Japan put out their space domain defense policy in which they are identify the ability to to highlight and predict hypersonic glide vehicle as extremely vital. They're also talking about building intercept capabilities. So in that context, you can see that partners and allies are already there, right? So the what I'm trying to say here is that the context has changed today because of what has happened. And so finally, to answer your question about interceptors, so in some sense, interceptors, especially in space, especially space to Earth, interceptors might be seen as escalatory because of the fact that you are going to be able to target a missile launch at its boost phase. It is at the boost phase where the missile is the most vulnerable, and because it has not deployed yet, it's the easiest to target, and so you are able to kill almost all the missiles at one go. You would need ground based interceptors for this. You would need space based sensors for this, including space based interceptors. I would end by saying that now that we have this concept, I would be not surprised if we have adversary nations then thinking about how they can use counter space capabilities to target those very sensors and interceptors on the ground, in terms of doctrinal thinking. So yeah, that's

Tad Schnaufer: 17:50

very interesting, because we've seen in the last couple of decades the addition of space and cyber to the official domains of warfare within within many doctrine assessments. So going to the, you know, deterrence piece, like you mentioned, an interceptor, if we could dig down a little bit deeper into that, so with the perception that comes with it. So it is this a bullet hitting a bullet, if you will, a missile coming from space to hit, a hypersonic missile launch from Russia or China or whoever may be launching it, or is it some other type of interceptor.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 18:21

So it is a missile hitting a missile right. So it's called the X atmospheric interceptor vehicle. It has a sensor then that tells you that the missile is coming. It's launched. It could be space based, it could be air based, or it could be earth based, right. And then it intercepts the missile that is coming at you, and so it is, if precise, and if we are able to achieve that level of interception, it is highly effective. We are not there yet because of the fact that missiles move so fast. We are talking about missiles that move so quickly between two to five minutes, so a very limited time to do the interception precisely. And when you're talking about hypersonic, it's moving very fast and so but exactly what you said, it's basically targeting a missile with another missile which is at the interceptor, and basically using computing, artificial intelligence, automation, human as well as very advanced computing to achieve this. So we are, we have all the technology today. The idea will now be vital to bring it all together into an architecture,

Tad Schnaufer: 19:33

right? So then, in a sense, your defense or deterrence capability is limited by the number of interceptors you have, assuming they're effective. So it would be, could this possibly, again, upset the current state of deterrence and start an arms race, and if you can just produce enough missiles to out, in a sense, overwhelm the interceptors? Is that? Is that a possibility, or has that been explored?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 19:54

So I will for that Tad, I will take you to the Israeli arendum, right? Because that's something. Thing that we have as an example, which is in real time. It has been used. It has been successful. So with the Iron Dome, first of all, I have to tell your audience that these are very expensive systems. They cost billions of dollars. So what in the Israeli case, the Iron Dome was able to identify Hamas launch short range missiles and deflect them, especially when they're going towards populated areas. So, but it is also true that several missiles were not deflected as because they aren't calculated that these were not going to populated areas, right? So one way there is a great paper on this by from West Point, where the authors argue that what Hamas did, and they noticed this, is that it produced so many missiles that the iron Dome's capability to deter almost all of them is impossible. So there is that, right? As you mentioned, that the adversary noticing the our, our, for example, deterrence by denial strategy could build so many missiles, right? The other thing which I didn't point out is that, why is boost face so vital? Because when a missile, when, when you launch a missile, and then the warheads are basically released in space. They also release decoys. And so when the sensor or the tracking system in space is observing it in real time, sometimes it might get confused with the decoys, right? And so those are the limitations. So it is true that one or two missiles might get through, but the idea is that the missiles that are coming at populated areas are going to be deterred. So have you seen

Tad Schnaufer: 21:47

any other examples? Obviously, we had the Iron Dome. But what about like David sling and some of these other anti missiles, or anti ballistic missile defenses? Have we seen those operational and effective, and will that somehow influence how the golden dome set up.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 22:01

So I mean, in some sense, besides that, the US, if you think about the current missile defense realities, we already have the space defense agencies tracking layer. We have, which is called tranche. We have the proliferated war fighting architecture, so we have capabilities that are able to track and detect missiles coming at us, right? So while we do have capacity to, for example, with the ages system, right or the Patriot system, we saw missiles being deterred, I think what we do not have today with the golden dome, which is why it is so unique and different, is that this is a system that is not only going to deter attacks by cruise missiles which do not get into space, but by those which actually are of the variety that China tested, which is the fractional orbital bombardment system, which is a big threat to the US homeland, right? And so we are not there yet, though. So we don't have that capacity yet. And one of the capacity that has to be developed for that to happen is, as I mentioned before, real time moving target indicator, which is like for your audience. If I'm a car moving and you and it's a car that has, for example, explosives right for you to target it, you need satellite base, no latency data that can then inform the interceptor that this car is dangerous. We need to get it out of the way. But don't forget, my car is moving at Mac five and more. It's very fast, so that's the capability that we haven't tested yet, and that's the hope that we will have that by 2028

Tad Schnaufer: 23:55

and you know, obviously AI is a big topic. Is AI playing with that ability to or playing a role in that ability to identify threats, obviously, analyze risk, analyze motion, that types of piece with this technology?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 24:07

Yes. So if you look at the mapping that the Iron Dome Israeli are in, dome basically worked on, artificial intelligence has played a vital role. So because we have, for example, let's take a hypothetical scenario to answer your question, right? So we let's take say we are in 2028 and we have the golden dome missile defense architecture being tested and showcased. So which means we will have hundreds of satellite constellations in low Earth orbit that is going to tell us, through their sensor capabilities, that there is a moving target coming at us. Right? To do that, we will have to have computing and AI capability that can analyze data very fast or in real time. So that's why super intelligent AI that is able to integrate such data is going to play a vital role. For example. In the Israeli case, with the Iron Dome, when not just for detecting but also for, say, predicting that a particular missile is coming at you, artificial intelligence has played a role, and there are a lot of great articles on that in the Israeli press that tells you how they do it.

Tad Schnaufer: 25:18

One of the other things that the golden dome has been focused on, as well as the Iron Dome in Israel is obviously these larger either cruise missiles or ballistic missiles, or these larger employment mechanisms. What about some of the more autonomous drones, or a lower level, lower flying threats that might be coming in? Is the golden dome almost layered, or is it really just focused on the big nuclear capable missiles?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 25:46

No, actually, great question to ask, right? So if you actually look at the memo, the golden dome is not just about, say, hypersonic missiles or this ICBM like intercontinental ballistic missiles, right? Basically, they want to target any advanced aerial threats, which includes drones. So they want to build missile defense capability that is layered. But also it's not just focused on the high end that we talked about so much, which is the unique thing about the golden dome, but also the kind of things that has been discussed historically in the US, including lower level aerial threats. For example, one of the biggest aerial threats, as you mentioned, are autonomous drones, right? We have seen this in the Middle East. We have seen this in the Ukraine conflict. So there is a lot of learning, and it includes that kind of aerial threats as well. So any aerial threat coming in the US is going to be in that particular architecture of the golden dome to be deterred. What's

Tad Schnaufer: 26:49

that going to look like? You know, we talked about the missiles. Obviously, a lot of that defense capability is going to come from space based systems. But some of these lower altitude threats, are those going to be more land based, or there's going to be sea based. How is that golden dome going to shape up?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 27:05

So the golden dome includes air, land, space based interceptors, right? And intelligence capabilities. So it's not just space based. You also have capability from the ground that can detect that. So if you read the golden dome architecture, it includes all four levels. One is land, sea base, air base and space base. So for example, if you have drone capability that can be detected from the ground and the interceptors could also be from the ground. The only unique thing that the golden dome does is that it's talking about space based interceptors in today's context. It is not new, as I mentioned to you before, but then this particular conversation, strategically has been reintroduced by the Trump administration with the golden dome memo. So yeah, to answer your question, it will be based on different levels of layered sensor capability as well as interceptor capability, right? So just to remind your audience, because I think sometimes when we talk about the golden dome, some reports that actually talked about it in detail historically can be forgotten, right? So one is, of course, the US Space Command, which was established by the Reagan administration. They came out with a plan called long range plan in 1998 a vision for 2020 and that particular plan actually has everything that we are talking about, in terms of the golden dome, and it talks about exactly what I said, different levels of interception. But you know, Dad, what was so fascinating they were thinking about space based interceptors then. And then, of course, you have the long range plan that was also put out in 1998 so which is also by Space com. And then the and then the Rumsfeld commission that also talked about this. So what the golden dome is doing is that it is reiterating all those technologies that these particular plants put out for defending US homeland, and also reiterating the fact that we need different levels of intersection, ground, air, sea and space.

Tad Schnaufer: 29:17

So like you said earlier, you mentioned the question, why the golden dome now, and it sounds like the technology is there, the threat level is there, and these things are all motivating the Trump administration to really push this thing forward.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 29:30

Yeah. And so besides the reports I mentioned, right? So one thing that I would also point out is that this is the big question to us. Why are we actually talking about the golden dome now, and what has changed in terms of technology, right? So I would argue that in the context of the conversation we had earlier, which is the arms control architecture, right? So with, for example, Russia was the one who suspended the who was actually suspected of violating the Inter. Immediate range Nuclear Forces Treaty, because it feel that land based intermediate range cruise missiles, and China was never a party to it, right? And so what we notice is that these nations have actually developed capacity that can reach the United States in the last few years. And that's a big realization the I think the second important thing is China changed the game in terms of why a golden dome is necessary because of the development of its hypersonic light vehicles, right? And then finally, as I mentioned before, there was China's testing of the fractional orbital bombardment system, right? And so that's something that is is vital. Now, in terms of technology, I've mentioned this again before, but I mean, I would like to reiterate that, right? I think the rise of small SATs and the CubeSat revolution has totally changed how we manage this system, so they are no longer dependent on single, costly satellites. These are much smaller satellites. They are cheaper, and they have been developed by the Space Development Agency, and then also launch. The launch of these satellites have come down. So during the Cold War, one launch cost you about $54,000 today, launch cost you about $2,500 per kilogram. So that's one very important reason. And then finally, as you mentioned, artificial intelligence, the speed of decision making, the speed of data being analyzed. So all that makes the golden dome much more feasible in today's context. Sorry to give you a long answer, but I thought it's really important to realize why is the United States talking about the feasibility of a golden dome architecture today?

Tad Schnaufer: 31:41

No, it makes perfect sense. And what it does sound like is we, throughout our whole conversation here, is that there's going to be a lot more capabilities, satellites, these different types of sensors, all going up in space. So how is that space security aspect of this program, along with the stuff that's already in space and the stuff that other countries are putting up there, whether it's the Indians or the Europeans or the Russians.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 32:05

So already, I mean, that's a great question to think about from the moral perspective, right? What it could do? So I can hypothesize and say that, well, it could result in some nations viewing a golden dome architecture as a first strike capability. So because of the fact that the US can target another nation with no fear of being attacked, right? So nations might see that as escalatory, especially nations like, say, China or Russia, that is possible. The second thing in terms of space security is that now that's the more hypothetically escalatory side, right? But in some sense, I think that when I'm listening to conversations, say strategic conversations in India, United Arab Emirates, Japan, as you ask, the European Union or European countries, what I'm hearing is that because some of these nations face threats of missile attack. They are seeing the development of a missile defense shield as actually quite useful, right? So most nations, especially India, with because it faces border disputes with China and Pakistan, and then Japan, which has very much suffered from missiles being launched from North Korea that falls into the Sea of Japan is actually quite interested in participating in a missile shield that offers their citizens some level of reassurance, right? And so I see that they are interested. And I'll tell you, because I just mentioned this in your podcast, the recent Japanese national security strategy, the desire to develop a ground moving target indicator, especially in real time that they announced that they're going to build their desire to collaborate more with the United States. Space Force as well tells you that while it has some escalatory dynamics in other ways, some nations are also perceiving this as improving their space security assets, right? But I'll finally end with the question that you asked, which is vital in terms of, what does it do to low Earth orbit, right? You have so many constellation structures now with 1000s of satellites to be launched to build the architecture for the Golden Dome. I think one issue that nations are really starting to discuss is, for example, what happens when these satellites get defunct, right? So you create debris, and do we have plans to deorbit it already? The US is making it mandatory for American companies to deorbit their satellites. But then you have other nations. What happens if other nations build this capacity? I don't think we have reached a level of maturity in terms of handling this many satellites in low Earth orbit yet. So the conversations have started in regard to space traffic management, space security stability, but I don't think we have reached a level of maturity, especially given this current developments. Wow. So

Tad Schnaufer: 34:59

you're talking about. A new career field of space traffic controllers.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 35:04

Oh, my Yes, I'm glad you brought that up Ted, because air traffic controllers, right? I mean, the very fact that I can take a plane from Montgomery, Alabama and fly to New Delhi, India is because countries have agreed to international air traffic rules, right? We don't have a similar space traffic management as yet, right? But I argue in my research, and this is taking away from the Golden Dome conversation, but the larger space security conversation is that once you have American private companies and other private companies invested in space one one space becomes absolutely vital for our communication, navigation, shipping, movement of goods, we will be incentivized to come to some level of space traffic management consensus as well, very similar to how air domain played out.

Tad Schnaufer: 35:56

That makes sense as it can become more crowded in space and one of the other pieces of space. You know, you mentioned a couple allies and partners in the United States, whether India, Japan, you know, we heard that maybe Canada might be interested in participating. What are we seeing across the world otherwise, on participation in this? Do they see it as a partner effort, or is this really just a US led extension of extended deterrence, pretty much a greater extension of its nuclear deterrence, if you will.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 36:25

Yeah, yeah. That's a great point to bring, actually, Ted, yeah. I mean, in some sense it really matters on if you're a treaty ally or not, right? So India is not a treaty ally of the United States, so in some sense partnership is a very different level, right? So extended deterrence will not be be for India, but then for treaty allies like Japan, or, for example, NATO partners, because you have Article Five. And by the way, which is fascinating, you ask this question. So NATO, a few years ago, stated that space is operational domain. And Article Five can be invoked, as you know, right, if space assets are targeted. So what conversation I'm hearing is that while the building of the architecture, the funding, which is about 25 billion, the first level of funding is, I think they agreed to 25,000,000,001 of my colleagues, Sam Wilson, has done a great paper on this for the Aerospace Corporation, where he tells us where exactly what is going. I would urge your audience, if they have time to look at that paper, it's on the budget and the Golden Dome. So I think at this point of time, burden sharing, I'm not hearing much right in terms of finances. It's a US led effort, US funded effort. But once you have the first level of demonstration successfully, I can imagine Japan joining in. Japan's building that kind of capability for deterrence purposes, right? So very clearly they see this as something I could see South Korea being interested in. I could see NATO member states being interested in. So there's a lot of potential here, as

Tad Schnaufer: 38:02

that program plays out. You know, there's also some ability to actually, you know, knock satellites out of orbit, or, you know, disrupt them. We've seen the Chinese actually shoot down some of their own satellites over the past couple decades, just to show that they have the capability. So is there this threat that the constellation even wants up there, still vulnerable to other types of attack. Oh, absolutely,

Dr Namrata Goswami: 38:24

I know, I know this is tricky. So, yes, so, because don't forget, right? So we are talking about this in times of conflict, not in times of peace, right? So conflict, that's why I always tell my students or my audience that nations behave differently in terms of conflict. So so one thing and adversary will obviously target is the missile defense architecture that another nation has that it might see to its disadvantage. So to answer your question, yes, China has anti satellite weapon capability. So does Russia, and this includes both kinetic and non kinetic, like laser, they have core middle assets, they have rendezvous and proximity operation capability, right? So almost all assets in space, including those to be utilized for the Golden Dome, could be vulnerable to anti satellite weapon attacks, jamming, spoofing. You know, interceptor communications could be intercepted through cyber attacks. So there's all that that is true of space assets today. Could also be true for a golden dome architecture.

Tad Schnaufer: 39:31

It's really an integrated system. You have to be able to have strong cybersecurity measures, space security measures, and then obviously all the other typical military domains that we normally operate in,

Dr Namrata Goswami: 39:42

yeah, and so and so. One thing that I'm noticing in the conversation on Chinese military doctrine is that, and this was before the golden dome memo was put out, right? So when the US Space Force talked about the proliferated architecture in space with the lower. Orbit constellation structure. So the argument was that, well, we can actually counter the attack on single satellites by building so many that it'll be hard, right? So one anti satellite weapon attack is not going to deter the whole system or make it, you know, unusable. So theoretically, the People's Liberation Army, strategic support force, which is China Space Force. Now the aerospace force put out a theoretical paper saying that, Well, China needs to think about systems level effects, which means that it needs to build a counter space capability that can target several satellites at once. Right? It's hard to do, but that's the theoretical thinking, and that happened in 2019 2019, 20, 20. Right. So we have five years from there. I don't have open source data to tell you whether they have achieved some level of demonstration in that, if in that, like in that particular capability, I do know they have anti satellite weapon capability and other from open source data, but whether they can do it in an integrated manner, I don't know yet, but that they will not try. I will be surprised if Chinese strategic thinkers do not think that way.

Tad Schnaufer: 41:10

Well and with with that in mind, what would you tell a US policy maker now is the biggest priority going forward with the golden dome and these different threats, whether it's missile or drone or autonomous systems. What's the priority as they start putting this program in place? I

Dr Namrata Goswami: 41:26

think the biggest priority to make to harden them right, to make them capable of deterring such attacks. Right? We can have technological development of capability that can actually negate the attacks on, say, satellite electronics, right? We can have, for example, if you have a cyber attack, we should be able to counter that. And so that has been a conversation for long. Can you maneuver? There are article arguments made that, well, if there is a, say, a kinetic attack and not a non kinetic attack, we should be able to maneuver a satellite. China just demonstrated last month the manure, the maneuvering of their Sharon 25 but can the can the US build such capability? I think that's a good thing, but I would if I was to advise a policy maker today, I would say, build capacity that hardens your satellite against such attacks, because you we do know what those attacks will look like. It's not like we don't. We do. We've simulated it. We know it technologically, what it is. So it is absolutely possible, if not, deter everything, but to deter the ones that we think are vital, for example, the golden dome space architecture, right? And then the second thing, I think a deterrence works, that if you could deterrence by punishment, right, not just denial. So China depends on satellites a lot today, including for its economic development. So deterring could happen if, if their satellites can be, you know, targeted as well. So that's another way that you can actually call their satellites at risk. So as

Tad Schnaufer: 43:07

we look at technology, you know, we talked about the expansive equipment these constellations going up in space, are there any other areas in space that are going to be home to some of these technologies, even possibly the moon?

Dr Namrata Goswami: 43:22

Oh, that's a great question to answer, because so let me take you back to the year 1994 so one of the mission that is globally very famous is the Clementine Mission. So basically, the Clementine Mission is known for its contribution to lunar mapping and for discovering water ice, which was later confirmed by the Indian Chandrayaan one mission, especially in the polar region. But I think most people don't realize that this was this mission, the Clementine Mission, was sponsored by the Department of Defense, Strategic Defense Initiative organization, which was renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in 1993 and so. And it was a collaboration between DOD and NASA. So what the Clementine Mission actually did was that it carried a suite of lightweight, you know, miniaturized sensors, including ultraviolet visible cameras, Near Infrared Camera. And so what it was doing was that it was actually testing surveillance and tracking systems, especially in a space environment. And this is vital for SDI, because with that kind of real time tracking, you can actually autonomously discriminate between what is the target and what is not so. Fascinatingly, Clementine, historically in the 1990s demonstrated what we are talking about with the golden dome today, which is that high performance sensors could be both lightweight, not too heavy, they could be power efficient, and that they could work as constellations for the kind of sensor technologies we need to be able to identify. Moving Target so fascinating that we were able to achieve that in the 1990s with a cost of merely $75 million so it did both. It confirmed the it discovered the water molecules on the lunar surface, but it also did amazing things for Strategic Defense Initiative.

Tad Schnaufer: 45:21

Wow. So we could actually expect, or not expect, but at least it's in the realm of possibility that we'd have Moon based sensors and possibly other equipment for this gold dome.

Dr Namrata Goswami: 45:32

Yeah, because in one of the papers that I wrote for the Aerospace Corporation, where I talked about the utility of cislunar space, the space between the Earth and the Moon for the United States, Space Force. I point out that the moon is going to play a very vital role, especially because of the fact that the moon looks down. So right now, most of our you know tracking and sensor capabilities are looking down on Earth, but not from the moon for the US, right? We're looking from geosynchronous orbit or low Earth orbit. So what happens is that the conversation, for example, that we've been hearing globally is that you can have anti satellite attacks, for example, right to any of those architecture a moon base architecture system with sensors and tracking systems can actually then determine if something is coming at an asset, for example, a US, asset in geosynchronous orbit. We don't have that capability yet. The only country, and this is concerning to me, the only country with a relay communications satellite and lunar logistics capacity, is China. China has a relay satellite in LaGrange Earth moon, Lagrange two that looks down at the lunar surface. And what China is arguing is that, well, once we have a base on the Moon, by 2036 we will have industrial logistics and communication infrastructure that can then determine the entire lower orbit to cislunar space. So I can see cislunar play a space playing a role, not today, but in the future, sometimes in terms of deterrence as well,

Tad Schnaufer: 47:07

well. Thank you so much for this insightful discussion today. Really appreciate having you on. Thank

Dr Namrata Goswami: 47:12

you Ted for having me.

Jim Cardoso: 47:18

Thanks to our special guest today, Namrata Goswami, Professor of space security at Johns Hopkins University. We hope you enjoyed our conversation about the golden dome attached offer in 2026 GNSI will be doing conferences with both space and nuclear weapons themes. So you may be hearing from Dr Goswami again in the future, next week on at the boundary. Dr Rob Burrell, senior research fellow GNSI, will be kicking off his research initiative, the future of war. Rob is one of the world's leading experts on irregular warfare, resilience and resistance. He's a fellow on the irregular warfare initiative at Arizona State University, and recently published his latest book on resilience and resistance on the podcast next week, Rob will have a probing conversation with retired US Army Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland and retired Army Colonel Dave Maxwell. General Cleveland is the former commanding general of US Army Special Operations Command, while Colonel Maxwell is a 30 year Army veteran who recently served as an Associate Director in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. You don't want to miss that episode, or, frankly, any other episodes, so be sure to hit that subscribe button. Thanks for listening today. If you like the podcast, please subscribe and let your friends and colleagues know. You can follow GNSI on our LinkedIn and X accounts at USF, underscore GNSI, and check out our website as well at usf.edu/gnsi, while you're there, don't forget to subscribe to our monthly newsletter that's going to wrap up this episode of at the boundary. Each new episode will feature global and national security issues we found to be insightful, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall, just worth talking about. I'm Jim Cardoso, and we'll see you at the boundary. You.